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Scrutinizing Perpetual Insecurities: 
A Dilemma Facing Lebanese-Syrian Relations 
 
 
 
 Third World states face a host of overlapping external and domestic threats.  
This thesis examines the causes and consequences of Lebanon’s insecurity dilemma, 
and looks at Lebanon’s relationship with Syria from a security complex perspective.  
Using an eclectic theoretical approach, the thesis investigates the structural, 
institutional, psychological and social causes of Lebanon’s insecurity dilemma, and 
the latter’s impact on state institutions, state-society relations, and Lebanon’s relations 
with Syria.  This thesis demonstrates how Lebanon’s insecurity dilemma creates a 
self-perpetuating confessional system that exposes the country to external 
interventions.  Accordingly, this thesis also considers whether it is possible to escape 
the trap of the insecurity dilemma in the future. 
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Chapter One 
An Eclectic Study of Insecurities 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis highlights the insecurity dilemma phenomena through an extensive 
study of the Lebanese-Syrian case.  Analyzing inter-state and intra-state relationships 
is a priority in order to elaborate the situation from an analytical and methodical 
perspective.  Insecurities are broad issues with a multitude of facets and levels 
ranging from the political, economic, social, demographic, military, ecological, and 
environmental.  Therefore, understanding the major sources of insecurities is vital for 
defining and setting up the basic dynamics of the relationship between Lebanon and 
Syria, as well as for regulating internal relationships within Lebanon. 
Strong bonds have dominated the Lebanese-Syrian relationship since mandate 
rule in the region.  Unfortunately, however, the brotherly relationships between the 
two countries broke down after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005.  The dramatic events 
of 2005 were the main factors behind the reanimation of the hidden conflict between 
the two states and within Lebanon as well.  Accordingly, understanding the rapid turn 
of events followed by an extensive analysis of the current situations may expose the 
real sources of the conflict.       
The internal divisions as well as external ones are major focal points for 
analyzing and understanding the situation.  Studying political parties, the juridical 
sector, police divisions, and civil society, or what can be identified as the vertical axis 
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(depending on the hierarchy principle), is necessary for analyzing and understanding 
the relationship between the government and citizens.  Therefore, comprehending and 
examining their direct and indirect influence on national security and policy formation 
is a priority for understanding the main causes of internal insecurities.  On the other 
hand, highlighting and studying the horizontal axis of this division helps in defining 
the relationship between the different parties including institutional functions and 
interactive relations within the state.  
Examining Lebanese politics alone is an insufficient condition for determining 
the nature of the relationship and the resultant insecurities with Syria, however.  
Rather a review of the Syrian state structure and Syrian policies is necessary for 
investigating the nature of the insecurities jeopardizing the relationship with Lebanon.  
Accordingly, emphasizing the horizontal axis (for interpreting inter-state 
relationships) is necessary to elaborate and highlight the basic elements responsible 
for shaping the authentic relationship between Lebanon and Syria.  Although the 
insecurity dilemma method is mainly concerned with internal rather than external 
threats, highlighting the horizontal axis (by focusing on external relationships) is vital 
for locating the state in the context of regional and international powers.  
The insecurity dilemma phenomenon as presented by Brian Job (2005) is a 
characteristic of Third World states especially weak ones with frail capabilities.  This 
model is especially designed for studying and analyzing countries like Lebanon.  The 
negative impact of insecurities on our societies hinders the progress and prosperity of 
the state and increases the division between the main constituents of the society.  
Once the society is deeply divided and fractured, it is hard to find a common ground 
for a stable community, a prerequisite for development and progress.  Lebanon and 
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Syria are outstanding examples with a multitude range of insecurities generated by 
daily interactions.  Many intertwining forces represented by sectarian, ethnic, and 
political divisions affect the structural composition of the Lebanese society and exert 
an impact on its domestic and foreign policies.  Such divisions’ affect interests and 
turns unity into an impossible mission.  Consequently, this affects relationships with 
neighboring states.  Thus, the main and basic features of the insecurity dilemma 
dominate and turn into a major source of tension, and are presented by the excess in 
using illegitimate coercive force against citizens, lack of proper infrastructural and 
institutional forces, and lack of legitimacy derived from citizens.  Brian Job (2005), 
Barry Buzan (1991), Georg Sørensen (2007), and John Glenn (1997), and other 
prominent scholars have examined most of the insecurity dilemma attributes and 
enriched the concept with valuable interpretations. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
Questioning and investigating the nature of insecurities in Lebanon is vital for 
clarifying the misperceptions concerning recurring upheavals.  Thus, what is 
Lebanon’s insecurity dilemma, and is it possible for Lebanon to escape this enforced 
phenomenon?  How can Lebanon achieve this? 
Defining the real situation through intra-state and inter-state relations can 
reveal the prospects for inter- and intra- insecurities in Lebanon, and defines how the 
insecurity dilemma affects state-society relations.  These research questions help 
apprehend the dangers of the enforced and generated circumstances and their impact 
on daily life.  
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1.3 Case Selection and Methodology 
Lebanon and Syria have always enjoyed close but problematic relations.  Syria 
has always looked upon Lebanon as its security backyard.  This, in turn, has invited 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon, creating mutual insecurity dilemmas between the two 
states.  This thesis investigates the causes of these dilemmas, mainly by comparing 
the difference in the state structure between the two countries, their policies, and 
social and behavioral reactions.  
This situation has reflected negative effects on Lebanese politics, economics, 
societal, and military conditions, and threatened stability and security factors.  Bloody 
confrontations have resulted in casualties and major destruction, which have affected 
the lives of ordinary citizens and caused demographic changes.  The possible break 
down of the state demanded urgent actions to limit the proliferation of endless 
insecurities including research and academic studies, which possess potentials for 
finding possible solutions through rational and sensible analysis faraway from 
political interferences.   
The insecurity dilemma is a major theory in international relations, discussing 
problems facing Third World countries extensively.  It also presents important 
explanations for the possible sources of insecurity in Third World states.  Despite 
various limitations, the insecurity dilemma tries to bring forward the real causes and 
effects of instabilities, vulnerabilities, and insecurities in states like Lebanon and 
Syria by combining behavioral, domestic, social, and structural realism approaches in 
order to reveal the nature of insecurities.      
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Theoretical interpretations are the appropriate solution for clarifying the 
conflict inside Lebanon as well as between Lebanon and Syria.  Thus, focusing on 
international relation theories sustained with empirical studies facilitates the process 
of explicating ambiguities through identifying state structures and relationships, and 
the consequent insecurity dilemma.  Both analytical and rational approaches are 
basics for investigating the dilemma from a rational stance with an emphasis on 
important key-points.  Weak states like Lebanon are subject to manipulations from 
external powers.  The chaotic situation leaves the space open for unfavorable 
interferences in domestic affairs.  However, when a state is sufficiently strong to 
defend its domestic arena; it leaves no opportunity for external and foreign 
interventions.  The strong state reinforces its situation and obliges other powers to 
respect its sovereignty and independence.  Geographic location and historical 
connections made Lebanon and Syria security zones with interdependent security 
interests.  Accordingly, studying the long-term as well as the short-term, direct and 
indirect forces is recommended for reducing uncertainties and misperceptions 
between the two peoples and states. 
A variety of secondary sources are used in this research.  The sources mainly 
depend on specialized books related to the topic explaining and discussing pertinent 
theories as well as history and foreign policies of Lebanon and Syria.  The scholarly 
articles complete the discussion and enhance the analysis with precise and explicit 
reviews concerning insecurities affecting the state and society structures and relations.  
Certified web pages and accredited reports in addition to televised interviews and 
news enrich the research with updated and ongoing incidents in order to contemplate 
their impact on the general situation.  
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1.4 Map of the Thesis                                                       
This thesis is divided into five chapters responsible for elucidating and 
examining the nature of the relationship between Lebanon and Syria from the 
insecurity dilemma perspective.  The next chapter undertakes a comprehensive study 
of the insecurity dilemma and its impact on weak states, especially Third World ones.  
By studying this concept theoretically we may determine the state-society relations 
and institutional and infrastructural capacities that result in insecurities.  Chapter three 
highlights and dissects the case study into its major components in order to correlate 
with and prove actual evidences by theoretical approaches.  Thus, configuring the 
historical background sheds light on the contemporary relationship through the 
intervening and interacting forces, which condition the insecurity and vulnerability 
levels and affect the stability factor.  Chapter four discusses the impact of direct and 
indirect human forces on studying the nature of actions and reactions towards policies 
from the normative and existentialist perspectives.  Such an attempt reveals the 
contradiction between the importance of regulations and the struggle for existence and 
survival.  The psycho-social analysis explains the outcome resulting from intentional 
and unintentional insecurities generated by the existence of dominating interests and 
power gaining.  The final chapter summarizes the main concepts and derives the 
appropriate answer to the research question after analyzing the insecurity dilemma 
phenomenon comprehensively and thoroughly. 
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Chapter 2 
The Insecurity Dilemma: A Theoretical Context 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical context and highlights different 
interpretations of the insecurity dilemma.  The deteriorating situation in almost all 
Third World countries, and especially weak ones, created opportunities for the spread 
of the insecurity dilemma.  Therefore, focusing on the analysis of the state structure, 
state-society relations, the impact of political parties, and state capabilities and 
authorities, can enrich the research, because these form the conditions for either 
generating or dispersing insecurities and instabilities. 
This chapter discusses the insecurity dilemma emphasizing the definitions 
provided by Brian Job and Barry Buzan.  The next step highlights the importance of 
the state structure in defining the insecurity levels, including the impact and effects of 
the dominant political parties.  Measuring the institutional capabilities of the state can 
also help in identifying the strength, sovereignty, authority, and identity factors, as 
well as enriching the analysis of state-society relations.  Subsequently, the prevalence 
of the security, infrastructural, and capacity gaps reveals the importance of discussing 
the legitimate and illegitimate use of force as a means to protect group interests, or as 
a tool to protect the state from possible threats.  Inefficiency and helplessness provoke 
gaps and reinforce threats, but dependency creates frail societies and weak states.  
Therefore, all these factors are integral parts of the insecurity dilemma, which ought 
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to be elaborated and discussed thoroughly.  State institutions are exposed to different 
factors and forces due to their dynamic and motivating functioning, and in turn, they 
can affect state stability and security. 
  
2.2 The Insecurity Dilemma  
Guaranteeing the security of the state and society is a priority.  Theorists 
began studying the insecurity dilemma extensively due to the increase in threats and 
vulnerabilities to states and societies.  Researchers have tried to explain the main 
factors behind insecurities, since they generate chaos and a state of anarchy that is 
inescapable.  Therefore, state structure and the behavior of the society are keys for 
understanding the concept and identifying its causes.  Insecurities are not just a cause 
for chaos; they are also an effect.  They cause vulnerabilities and threats, and they are 
caused by disorder and confusion.  In this thesis, the study of the insecurity dilemma 
is strictly related to state structure and actors with regional and international alliances 
that have an influence on domestic policy-making.  According to Job (2005), “the 
state is at issue in most conflicts” (p. 18).  Intra-state factors concern Job more than 
inter-state ones.  He highlights the main causes and consequences generated from the 
(action-reaction) relationship between the different and diversified participants.  The 
components of society vie to preserve and protect their own well-being (Job, 2005).  
When weak states cannot provide security for their own citizens, as Buzan 
emphasized, chaos and foreign interventions dominate, creating an unstable situation 
(1991).  Their instability causes threats and vulnerabilities to neighboring states.  
 9 
Therefore, the insecurity dilemma is associated with the general condition of Third 
World countries and especially weak ones.  
 
2.2.1 Descriptions and Definitions  
After discussing the background of the insecurity dilemma briefly, it is 
important to define the term thoroughly due to the wide range of interpretations and 
the multiple opinions concerning insecurities, which lead to a variety of definitions.  
For Job, “Third World states must cope and function within a unique and particularly 
troublesome security environment… a condition that we shall characterize as an 
insecurity dilemma” (2005, 14).  He identifies four variables for detecting the 
insecurity dilemma: 
1. Within the borders of the state, there is often no single nation… 
Instead, there are usually a variety of communal groups 
contending for their own securities and for supremacy over their 
competitors.  
2. The regime in power, therefore, usually lacks the support of some 
significant component of population, because the regime 
represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or social sector, 
or an economic or military elite that has control… 
3. The state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace 
and order, as well as the conditions for satisfactory physical 
existence, for the population. 
4. …Internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than 
externally motivated threats… (Job, 2005, 17-18). 
By focusing on internal threats rather than external ones, then, Job missed an 
important direct and/or indirect generator of these threats.  External powers are one of 
multi-activators that can influence state elites and social players, especially in weak 
states.  Consequently, external powers have the capacity to affect policy-making and 
have the power to increase conflict within societies.  They empower one communal 
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group or political party over opposing groups, therefore creating tension and 
increasing disputes.  By attempting these unfavorable acts, they are creating a sense of 
insecurity for some sectors that may lead to chaos within the state. 
Similarly, Barry Buzan argues that “only when one has a reasonable idea of 
both the nature of threats, and the vulnerabilities of objects towards which they are 
directed, can one begin to make sense of national security as a policy problem” 
(Buzan, 1991, 112).  In fact, and unlike Job, Buzan considers external threats as a 
factor of insecurities and not only a consequence.  He claims that “national security 
policy can either focus inward seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself, 
or outward, seeking to reduce external threats by addressing its sources” (Buzan, 
1991, 112).  Consequently, weak states become subject to manipulation and 
exploitation, a situation that most Third World countries face.  But, the main issue 
remains focused on the idea of how weak states can minimize the prospects of 
deterioration and slipping into a failed state status.  It is a hard and rough course, 
especially for states with little or no capabilities.  On that account, states should seek 
to reduce their insecurities either by reducing their vulnerability, or by preventing or 
decreasing levels of threat imposed by other states (Buzan, 1991).  Despite the 
differences in interpreting state insecurities, both Job (2005) and Buzan (1991) agree 
that weak states are overwhelmed with discord and dissention.  This results in an 
increase of threats and instabilities. 
The security complex is another concept introduced by Buzan (1991) for 
complementing the idea of national insecurity to examine security studies.  He defines 
the concept as, “A group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
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apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991, 190).  Thus, Buzan (1991) distinguishes 
between three major factors that result in the formation of this complex.  He 
emphasizes the levels of threats, security interdependence, and outside pressures as 
the main features of the complex.  “Since threats operate over short distances,” Buzan 
argues, “security interactions with neighbors will tend to have first priority” (1991, 
191).   
Lebanon and Syria are two countries intertwined by a set of interdependent 
relations.  Their relations are tremendously affected by the sensitivity of their 
geography and historical background, which adds more burdens on the intensity of the 
security requirements.  The mutual respect and recognition of the independency and 
sovereignty of both states can enhance relationships and minimize disputes, but this is 
not the only solution and path to escape different interferences.  Open dialogue for 
delineating misconceptions and misinterpretations, can help both states overcome 
their disagreements.  Inevitably, amity (based on friendship relations that provide 
support and protection) can eliminate any possible dispute, since relationships are 
built and based on mutual respect.  On the contrary, relations built on enmity (based 
on suspicious and fearful interactions) increase the prospects of insecurity and 
conflict.  States have to strengthen their internal powers and capacities in order to 
abate dependency levels on external ones.  Thus, preserving harmony secures the state 
and maintains the status quo in the face of the occurring and recurring hostilities and 
transformations. 
 
2.2.2 Insecurity Signals 
But why is security so necessary and who needs it?  Is it possible to escape 
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insecurities and minimize security gaps?  If so, then how can be achieved? 
 By referring to the definition of the insecurity dilemma, we notice the impact 
of state performance on society’s behavior and the reflection of interaction with our 
surrounding.  Unfortunately, the concept of weak states reinforces the idea of 
insecurity, but survival remains the ultimate target.  Survival strategies are designed 
to satisfy needs and secure individuals as well as states, and “the choice of 
components for one’s strategy of survival is severely constrained by available 
resources, ideas, and organizational means” (Migdal, 1988, 27).  The four variables of 
the insecurity dilemma explain the presence of gaps that results in the weakness of the 
state.  Although not all four features of the insecurity phenomenon can be found at the 
same time in the same country, states still face major threats that endanger their 
stability and security.  The sovereignty factor helps in creating states and maintaining 
their integrity as a requirement for gaining supreme authority and ultimate source of 
law, which enhances the constitutional independence of the state (Holsti, 2004).  
Sovereignty allows states to guarantee their existence and activate their membership 
in the international arena.  They are basic requirements for benefitting from the World 
Bank, joining international organizations, exchanging diplomats, and acquiring the 
necessary authority to negotiate and ratify treaties (Holsti, 2004).  
Unfortunately, due to their dependence on international recognition, the 
sovereignty and authority of Third World states are controlled by great powers.  
These powers regulate and dominate their decision-making process.  This ensures that 
Third World states will always remain weak powers with total or partial dependence 
on their sensibilities and capabilities.  Negative sovereignty1 reinforces insecurity 
features, and encourages weak attributes that exacerbate excess vulnerabilities and 
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generate more problems. 
“National security is the right of states, and sovereign states claim it as a right, 
the right for independence and non-intervention” (Jackson, 2005, 87).  States possess 
the legitimate right to use force against any source of threat either internally or 
externally.  They have the right to defend their borders against threats and to preserve 
their sovereignties as well as their independence.  Security institutions and agencies 
own the adequate and legitimate means to enforce sanctions and promote defense.  
They are responsible for ensuring stability and security for survival.  But, the main 
concern remains restricted to the capabilities and efficiencies of these institutions, as 
well as the dynamic players who mobilize and rule them. 
Lack of capable institutions, and especially security ones, affects the general 
performance of the state and reinforces disputes and invites interferences.  When 
crime levels escalate and disorder intensifies, this leads to an increase in security, 
legitimacy, and capacity gaps.  As a result, tension and stagnant relations dominate 
communities and parties and increase the divide between the state and society.  In this 
case, the state and its institutions, but chiefly military and police divisions 
commanded by ruling elites, may turn into a source of threat and transform to an 
oppressive tool against their citizens.  They become more oppressive, because they 
believe in obedience rather than loyalty (Buzan, 1991).  Inevitably, the society as a 
core element of the state can jeopardize capacities and promote total weakness and 
fragility, whereas unified, loyal, and cohesive societies reinforce the overall 
capabilities of the state.  
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2.3      The Strong-Weak State Dialectic 
Discussing the insecurity dilemma requires an analysis of the concept of 
strong and weak states.  Many states face different kinds of threats, ranging from 
military to environmental, economic, and social.  Consequently, states are subject to 
vulnerabilities and insecurities without any protective measures.  This is exacerbated 
in Third World states because of an increase in confrontation and incompatible 
competition between and among different communal groups, which fragments society 
and creates a state of anarchy.  As Kenneth Waltz suggests, “States vary in more than 
their status as powers.  They also vary in terms of their degree of sociopolitical 
cohesion” (as cited in Buzan, 1991, 97). 
The strong-weak state concept is defined by depending on different 
perspectives, allowing states to be measured in accordance to external and internal 
factors.  The external factors determine the capacity of the state to interact in the 
international arena, whereas the internal factors emphasize the performance of the 
institutions inside the state as well as state-society relations (Job, 2005).  The 
institutional capacities and functions, for Buzan, are measuring tools of the strength or 
weakness of the state.  Buzan thus notes that:  
Weak states either do not have or failed to create, a domestic political and 
social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of 
force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of 
the nation.  Weak power is one that lacks economic and military 
capability in relative terms vis-à-vis the other states in the system.  A 
weak power lacks effective institutional capacities and is not able to 
efficiently mobilize its potential natural and human resources (as cited in 
Job, 2005, 21). 
On the other hand, Joel Migdal defined strong states in relation to their 
institutional capacities.  “Migdal perceives the strength of the state in the ability of 
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state leaders to use the agencies of the state and to get people in the state to do what 
they want them to do” (as cited in Job, 2005, 21).  This relationship between the state 
and society, from Migdal’s perspective, is important to determine the power and 
strength of the state.  He views the state as the ultimate source and the only entity that 
can use coercive power legitimately.  Therefore, and according to Migdal, the state 
holds the necessary capacity to extract natural resources, and possess legitimate 
power to impose its authority over society (Job, 2005). 
Migdal believes that the main attributes of a strong state are as follows: 1) The 
ability to extract resources; 2) The ability to mobilize the population; 3) 
Infrastructural capacity and service provision; 4) Effective usage of coercive force; 5) 
Military and police capabilities; and 6) Social cohesion (Job, 2005).  Furthermore, 
divided societies make weak states and fragile communities.  Their impact on the 
state is devastating, given that they promote disputes and invite external intervention, 
which creates insecurities.  Consequently, when the state gradually starts to lose its 
capabilities, and becomes a weak and vulnerable one, it tends to seek all means of 
protection including the use of illegitimate coercive force in order to ensure its 
longevity, and to preserve the narrow interests of the state elites.  This creates a sense 
of instability, vulnerability, and fear among the citizens, and it can turn into a real 
threat to society, even though the normal role of the state is to ensure protection 
(Buzan, 1991).  Inescapably, state attributes and structures affect state-society 
relations.  
The ability to deter external threats and secure borders depends on the 
availability of military capacities, and in turn, military capabilities require an adequate 
police sector for preventing internal disorder.  The latter can undermine state cohesion 
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and promote fragmentation.  On that account, citizens become more dependent on 
their government for providing them with the necessary security internally as well as 
externally.  An effective police sector ensures efficient and equitable implementation 
of regulations for stable societies, and enhances the function process of state 
institutions, which guarantee adequate supply of public goods and services in addition 
to preserving the welfare of the society.  Lack of a capable security sector encourages 
corruption and promotes system defects, and as a result some governments encourage 
a partnership with the private sector as a reform tool, which promotes a strict 
regulatory system with rapid revenue collection.  This attempt minimizes the 
prospects of individual dependency on the public sector.  “As a policy procedure,” 
Buzan notes, “the state sacrifices the interests of some for what is seen to be a higher 
collective interest” (1991, 45).  This can jeopardize the relationship, and increase 
gaps, between citizens and the government.  Furthermore, preferring the private sector 
to the public one promotes excess in labor strikes due to inhuman regulations that 
advance profits and incompatible competition to normal human relations.  It results in 
chaos as a response to the dismissal of laborers and imbalanced relations between the 
employer and employee based on lack of trust and liability.  In turn, labor syndicates 
demand security and support for their rights against any arbitrary actions 
accompanied with decreasing quality and quantity of services.  Suspicions and 
inquiries overwhelm the relationship between the state and society.  As a result, 
Migdal perceives the relation between the state and society as a competitive and 
contradictory one: “the state is frequently in opposition to much of society it contains” 
(as cited in Buzan, 1991, 45).  
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2.4 State-Society Relations 
As a first step, it is important to identify types of states in order to address the 
nature of state-society relations.  The assumption that the state is the ultimate source 
of authority infers that it seeks legitimacy from the consent of the citizens.  This also 
assumes a distinction between maximal and minimal states. 
“Maximal States depend on the notion that the state should constitute more 
than the sum of its parts and it has interests of its own that might derive from a 
number of sources” (Buzan, 1991, 40).  The minimal state, however, depends on the 
concept of the social contract as developed by John Locke, and requires a mutual 
agreement of the citizens who make it up.  Governors require the consent of the 
citizens who are capable of judging the state according to the impact of 
accomplishments and achievements on interests and needs of the society.  
Consequently, “states are perceived as the cumulative sum of their components” 
(Buzan, 1991, 39).  The maximal state appears to be more aggressive and oppressive 
than the minimal state, and accordingly, state-society relationship depend on the 
general structure of the state in addition to the performance and orientation of the 
regime in power.  But, when do regimes act differently than others, and subsequently 
affect the welfare and interests of their citizens?  What is the distinctive feature that 
shapes the state actions and defines their attitudes towards the public? 
State-society relations in maximal states differ from those in minimal states, 
mostly in defining the levels of demand and interactions.  There is the necessity for 
survival and well-being of individuals, but the exploitative attitude of state elites 
prevents its accomplishment despite the fact that the state is an independent entity and 
a source of support and protection (Buzan, 1991).  Preserving security and stability 
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requires maximal states to pay more attention to the needs and interests of their 
citizens.  This attention secures the relation between the state and society, and 
prevents clashes that might lead to drastic civil wars and loss of international 
legitimacy due to inefficient mobilization of human resources (Buzan, 1991).  
Naturally, the state demands respect and obedience of regulations in order to 
guarantee the security and stability of society, but sometimes intentions depart from 
flawed declarations and become aggressive in nature especially when interests 
supersede values.  Consequently, defects exacerbate and turn the relation between the 
state and society into a skeptical one.  However, this distinction between state-
centered and society-centered approaches to state-society relations, in addition to 
institutional factors, is significant for molding patterns of domination (Migdal, 1994).  
Because regimes control the decision-making process, they can be considered 
a key element in mobilizing struggles and creating insecurities, which creates a 
“mutually transforming interaction between components of the state and social 
forces” (Migdal, 1994, 9).  As an interactive challenge depending on actions and 
reactions, individuals seek support and security from their states, but the misuse of 
state powers turns into a source of threat to personal securities.  Buzan captures this 
dilemma well,  
The individual citizen faces many threats, which emanate either directly 
or indirectly from the state… Such threats can be grouped into four 
categories: 1) those arising from domestic law-making and enforcement; 
2) those arising from direct administrative or political action by the state 
against individuals or groups; 3) those arising from struggles over control 
of the state machinery; 4) and those arising from the state’s external 
security policies (1991, 44). 
The possibility of conflicts intensifies as a result of the intended or unintended use of 
state power, which creates domestic fissures.  Accordingly, the subsequent disorderly 
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domestic state of affairs encourages external interferences in domestic affairs. 
Migdal argues that, “any struggle for domination in society involves the 
essence of how these societies are and should be constituted, their norms and rules, 
regulations and laws, symbols and values” (1994, 10).  In domestic conflicts, the state 
loses its legitimacy and authority to govern, and accordingly citizens refrain from 
considering state institutions as the legitimate authority responsible for implementing 
regulations and governing society.  As a response, citizens start to mobilize their 
efforts to defend their rights, given that the state has become a part of the struggle.  
Furthermore, the possibility that “the state may reflect its human components 
(statesmen and rulers) to some extent, it quickly becomes more than the sum of its 
parts (maximal state feature), and therefore develops non-human modes of behavior 
(interests overcome values)” (Buzan, 1991, 62).  Powerful statesmen and state elites 
take advantage of their positions and manipulate state institutions and decision-
making processes for their own benefit.  A single actor with multi-functions possess 
the capability to reinforce other active actors in the society, as well as regional and 
international ones, and this results in an insecurity dilemma with multitude security, 
capacity, and legitimacy gaps. 
 
2.4.1 Security Gaps: Sources and Outcomes 
Security is an essential element in determining stability and ensuring state 
prosperity; therefore, it is an effective tool for sustainable development and equitable 
progress.  Unfortunately, Third World states are subject to different direct and/or 
indirect, internally and/or externally imposed pressures, which create major security 
gaps.  These gaps can be powerful enough to break down weak states, thus they turn 
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into failed states with no capabilities or authorities.  Nonetheless, it is important to 
take into consideration that security gaps are not static, since security levels oscillate 
and fluctuate according to the intensity of threats.  The insecurity dilemma according 
to Georg Sorenson results in three kinds of gaps: the “Security Gap” is the inability to 
protect the population within the state; the “Capacity Gap” is the inability to provide 
necessary social values; and the “Legitimacy Gap” is the lack of popular support 
(2007).  Accordingly, “the human cost of weak and failed statehood is extremely 
high” (Sorensen, 2007, 366). 
Weaknesses and conflicts within the state intensify insecurity levels, and 
promote more chaos and instability.  Inevitably, regional powers benefit from the 
domestic vulnerabilities of their neighbors.  For them, it is considered a medium to 
benefit from, and increase their securities in order to preserve their status as powerful 
regional actors.  As a natural response, they attempt to interfere in domestic affairs 
and empower allied groups to ensure their future domination and secure their position 
in the region.  In order to benefit from the chaotic situation and cause a change in 
domestic affairs, foreign powers ought to be sufficiently influential.  Over and above, 
states do not guarantee to exercise absolute influence by interfering in the domestic 
affairs of other states, unless they gain domestic allies.  Domestically, actors also 
search for their own allies at the domestic, regional, or international levels to support 
their cases and provide them with the necessary military, economic, logistic, and 
financial help.  Accordingly, when interests meet; goals can be easily achieved.  As a 
result, the outcome becomes the struggle of foreign powers through the mobilization 
of domestic groups for their own benefits. 
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Sovereign and independent states try to minimize gaps and reduce insecurities 
by enhancing and strengthening state capabilities.  Therefore, capabilities and 
resources are important for defining and shaping their power, because their authority 
and legitimacy is an indication of the loyalty of their citizens.  Thus, maintaining the 
relationship between the state and society is significant; it aims to preserve security 
and reduce the insecurity dilemma features. 
In principle, Robert Jackson suggests that, “every state is independent in the 
management of its own affairs… and foreign interference is a violation of rights” (as 
cited in Job, 2005, 87).  National integration is necessary for ensuring the unity of the 
state and preserving security, thus actors tend to define interests in accordance with 
their needs and circumstances, whereas interests depend on identities embodying 
actions and reactions.  Because individuals constitute societies, power and knowledge 
become basic determinants of both.  Ernest Haas argues that, “Individuals are not the 
captives of system structure, but can influence the course of events.  Changing 
knowledge can lead to redefining interests; organizations can adapt and learn” (in 
Viotti and Kauppi, 1989, 319).  Unavoidably, since knowledge and experience can 
change according to circumstances and progress, competition rather than cooperation 
becomes more intense.  It reveals the hidden skepticism between the competing 
groups in plural societies, which results in a state of anarchy.  The anarchic system is 
perceived as the basis for defining competition, self-help, and the political 
environment that states operate under (Buzan, 1991).  When security, capacity, and 
legitimacy gaps grow, thus hindering the development process, the relationship 
between the state and society deteriorates. 
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Accordingly, identifying the causes of these gaps can strengthen the analysis 
and limit unnecessary misperceptions.  Depending on the categorization provided by 
Job, then, insecurities could be classified according to direct and indirect forces with 
internal and external influences on the long or short term (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Direct/indirect causes of internal/external defects and insecurities on 
the long/short term 
 
CAUSES DIRECT/LONG-
TERM 
INDIRECT/LONG-
TERM 
DIRECT/SHORT-
TERM 
INDIRECT/SHORT-
TERM 
INTERNAL 1) Low Institutional 
functioning 
 
2) Clientelism and 
corruption  
 
3) Inequitable 
development, 
which increases 
deprivation 
 
4) Internal migration 
due to deprivation 
and under-
development 
 
5) Misuse of state 
assets and natural 
resources 
 
6) Internal disputes 
as a result of 
strained state-
society relations 
  
7) Diverting 
Interests result in 
fluctuation in the 
performance of 
political parties 
 
8) Profound disputes 
between different 
parties causing 
excess in 
opposition 
 
1) Plural society and 
confessional 
system 
 
2) Ineffectual 
electoral laws, 
which increase 
exclusion and 
alienation  
 
3) State structure and 
political parties 
 
4) Debilitating 
regulations, which 
increase 
discrimination 
 
5) Loyalty to ethnic, 
tribal, and 
communal groups 
plus religious 
leaders rather than 
the state 
 
6) Demographic 
irregularities plus 
increase in 
migration rates 
 
7) Presence of gaps 
 
8) Lack of cohesive 
societies 
 
9) Lack of 
infrastructural 
capabilities 
 
1) Illegitimate use 
of force against 
citizens 
 
2) Corruption and 
misuse of assets 
and resources 
 
3) Deterioration of 
infrastructural 
capacities  
 
4) Economic 
stagnations 
 
5) Oppressive 
political parties 
and statesmen 
 
6) Demographic 
irregularities 
 
7) Unemployment 
and under-
employment  
 
 
8) Technological 
advancement 
affects the 
performance of 
state institutions 
 
9) Lack of 
experienced and 
skilled workers 
1) Corrupted statesmen 
and state elites 
 
2) Gap between the state 
and society 
 
3) Social discrimination 
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10) Lack of popular 
legitimacy 
 
11) Weak institutional 
performance 
EXTERNAL 1) Foreign 
interferences 
reinforce the 
division of the 
society and 
domination of 
state institutions 
 
2) Reinforcement of 
discrimination 
sustained by the 
loyalty to foreign 
allies depending 
on communal, 
sectarian, and 
religious basis 
1) Globalization and 
interdependence 
 
2) Transnational and 
international 
corporations, which 
can dominate and 
regulate national 
economies 
 
3) Emergence of a 
new kind of a 
protectorate system 
1) Military 
intervention 
 
2) Enforcement of 
strict conditions 
on financial 
assistances and 
loans 
 
3) Institutional 
reformation helps 
in accomplishing 
domestic 
interests  
1) Foreign interferences 
through international 
organizations, which 
can either be of partial 
presence or total 
replacement of the 
natural role of the state 
institutions in 
providing services 
 
2.5 International, Regional, and Domestic Responses to State 
Insecurities 
The international community plays an important role in resolving disputes and 
promoting peace and security within and among states.  The mutual recognition of 
sovereignties and independence of states encourages them to enhance their role as 
protectors and defenders of rights and laws.  Undoubtedly, the international 
community promotes the concept of non-intervention and prevention of weapon 
proliferation to protect the rights of sovereign states.  The main mission is to promote 
national as well as international peace and security. 
“For four-plus decades the international system operated under the influence 
of the superpowers, creating a security environment of pervasive penetration” (Job, 
2005, 13).  Superpowers ensured that Third World states developed within a global 
context dominated by them.  A set of conditions and regulations governed the 
development process of Third World states, enabling the international system to 
interfere either directly or indirectly in the domestic affairs of almost all developing 
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states.  In turn, such interferences affect state regulations and decision-making 
processes, ergo influencing local actors by the performance and function of a 
specifically designed set of regulations, which govern and control state institutions.  
Furthermore, state-society relations are left under the indirect control of foreign 
powers.  In many instances, this situation exceeds the capacity of the state to absorb 
consequences, and results in a decline in the performance of state institutions.  
Therefore, states and state elites become agents of superpowers.  As Buzan (1991) 
notes:  
The local states do have considerable influence over how external powers 
impinge on their affairs.  But, they have little ability to control external 
penetration unless they are able to resolve the local rivalries, which 
generate the demand for external support (1991, 222). 
Domestic cohesion requires cooperation between different social actors and 
state elites, otherwise the level of external interferences in domestic affairs increases.  
External actors seek to weaken the government in order to control it.  Both domestic 
and external allies reinforce each other and help in vexing their rivalries through 
empowerment and extra funding based on interests and benefits (Buzan, 1991).  
Consequently, resources play an important role in foreign interferences by providing 
political parties and state elites the necessary material as well as non-material support 
in order to ensure the loyalty of their followers.  Foreign parties manipulate domestic 
political games, since they constitute a vital source of financial funds as well as 
military supplies.  Such actions raise the anger of other opposing parties, which might 
drive them to respond in an aggressive manner depending on the intensity of their 
reaction. 
Regional states interfere in the affairs of neighboring countries to protect their 
own security.  However, unlike the behavior of international actors, regional states 
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need to limit the spread of conflicts, which might affect their internal politics as well 
as their regional status and interests.  The international response is much more general 
in nature than the regional one; it is derived from the sense of obligation to 
international peace and security, or to geopolitical rivalry.  Nonetheless, interests and 
the general welfare of states have shaped the response of international actors.  
International intervention in regional and internal disputes alarms some groups, and 
urges them to react to such interferences either by balancing or bandwagoning in 
order to protect their interests and their regional position.2 As a result, clash of 
interests may emerge and bring about turbulence and stagnation. 
International and regional responses demand preservation, and accordingly 
they seek trustworthy and reliable domestic allies.  That is to say, some domestic 
allies empower the international and regional forces and grant them the required 
legitimacy and authority to act freely.  This cooperative relationship between and 
among them authorizes the implementation of international resolutions by exerting 
pressures and enforcing laws, and in turn, they aim to force disputants to abide by the 
rules in order to safeguard states and secure societies. 
 
2.5.1 The Overlap Between Domestic and External Actors 
Domestic governments seek resources to fund development projects required 
to guarantee their legitimacy.  They seek international recognition as a condition for 
legalizing their authority permitting them to issue and pursue regulations necessary 
for their integration in the international arena as independent and sovereign states.  
The ultimate mission of the government is to protect the society through legal 
enforcement of rules and regulations, thus providing equitable distribution of 
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resources to prevent discrimination and communal and ethnic conflicts.  Statesmen 
and state elites may face fierce opposition during the implementation of certain 
decisions, which contradict with the interests of some minorities or other communal 
and ethnic groups.  Accordingly, they constitute a major threat to the government by 
promoting confrontation and reinforcing fragmentation resulting in the generation of 
opposing parties.  Each party seeks international, regional, and domestic allies for 
gaining the necessary and intended support.  This action and reaction creates tension 
in the domestic affairs and intensifies the confrontation between and among 
government actors.  According to Buzan, then: 
Domestic political violence frequently opens the door to the further threat 
of external intervention, either as participant on one side or the other (the 
Syrians and the Israelis in Lebanon…), or as invaders taking advantage of 
a state weakened by internal disputes (1991, 46). 
Unquestionably, domestic conflicts have international and regional 
dimensions as a result of direct and indirect interferences in the decision-making 
process.  Foreign interference in domestic affairs increases the levels of exploitation 
and corruption, because international approval on domestic decisions can be 
demanded as a condition for the continuity of their support and assistance.  An 
obvious overlap of foreign interests and domestic needs govern the decision-making 
process and instead of enhancing the situation, they result in insecurities and 
instabilities. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined state-society relations in Third World states from the 
insecurity dilemma perspective.  The state structure shapes institutional capabilities 
and state-society relations.  Internal cohesion and harmony between and among 
different communities within society defines state survival.  Cooperative relations 
minimize the possibilities of fragmenting society, which invites external intervention 
in domestic affairs.  As a result, dependency on external powers increases and 
development decreases due to the possibility of using illegitimate force by state elites 
against citizens to preserve their longevity and survival.  Thus, different alliances 
emerge between different groups, whether domestic or foreign, in order to preserve 
their interests.  The next chapter discusses how Lebanon’s insecurity dilemma allows 
Syria to intervene in Lebanon’s domestic politics, and highlights the nature of the 
historical as well as the new, post-2005, relations between the two states. 
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Chapter Three 
Plural Societies and Insecurities: A Dilemma Facing 
Lebanese-Syrian Relationship 
3.1 Introduction 
“Throughout history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one 
people” (Dawisha, 1980, 37).  This assertion by President Hafez Asad emphasizes the 
importance of the relationship between Syria and Lebanon for the Syrian leadership.  
The emphasis on the “one people” expression reflects the combined interests, shared 
history, and common background of both states.  This chapter compares and contrasts 
the differences and similarities governing the relationship between both countries.  It 
also distinguishes between the different state structures and plural societies in 
Lebanon and Syria, which affect the overall performance of the state.  Despite the fact 
that they are one people in two countries, threats and vulnerabilities governed 
Lebanon and Syria’s relations reaching a critical stage, which led to the dramatic 
events of 2005. 
The chapter opens with a brief analysis of the historical background in both 
countries.  This helps establish the sources of the insecurity dilemma in Lebanon and 
its intermittency in Syria.  The resilient attitude of political parties influences foreign 
policy towards each state, and affects the overall performance of the state as well, 
without missing to differentiate between the structures and orientations of the political 
parties themselves.  This plays a decisive role in determining the features of the 
insecurity dilemma in Lebanon and Syria.  
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3.2 Analytical Assessment of the Position of Lebanon 
The existence of sectarian groups in Lebanon influences the socio-political 
system and affects the level of social cohesion.  Lebanon’s plurality, in addition to the 
existence of a confessional system, aids in fragmenting political decisions.  Despite 
the frequent attempts to normalize and stabilize the society, sectarian antagonism 
precedes all other calculations.  Since the declaration of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the 
formation of the modern state has faced several insecurities.  Each sectarian group 
grapples and struggles for domination in order to enhance its political position.  As 
Kamal Salibi has noted: “As Arab Nationalists, Sunnites and Shiites saw that their 
incorporation in a Lebanese state under Christian domination meant their permanent 
separation from the Arab Moslem World” (Salibi, 1977, 169).  In A House of Many 
Mansions, Salibi (1988) highlights the direct influence of the French mandate on the 
state structure and constitutional order.  In The Break-Down of The State in Lebanon, 
Farid El Khazen (2000) examines the influential role played by different sectarian 
groups in shaping the political confessional system.  He notes that, “Lebanon opted 
for a unitary state with centralized administration, but preserved the communal 
political structure embodied in the confessional system” (Khazen, 2000, 95).  This is a 
major defect in Lebanon’s state structure, which promotes cyclical crises and 
insecurities.3 
Both Christian and Muslim political elites and social groups have chosen to 
ignore the real causes of Lebanon’s problems and search for others to blame.  In order 
to achieve the intended results in analyzing the situation in Lebanon, defining the 
identity of the state and examining state-society relations are vital.  Consequently, 
assembling essential facts and incidents can enhance the discussion and enrich the 
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research with valuable outcomes.  No doubt, foreign influences have contributed 
immensely to the deterioration of the situation by favoring one sectarian group over 
others.  
 
3.2.1 Status and Identity Formation 
Lebanon gathers a number of unique identities, contributing to external 
interferences in domestic politics and the decision-making process.  Because different 
interactive forces can influence identities, developing a strong identity is a means for 
achieving the security of citizens and stability of societies.  According to Peter 
Berger: 
Identities are inherently relational: Identity, with its appropriate 
attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, 
socially constructed world… Each person has many identities linked to 
institutional roles, such as brother, son… Similarly the state may have 
multiple identities as sovereign, leaders of the world… (as cited in Wendt, 
1992, 397-398).  
Enhancing the sense of pride in a nation requires developing capable states with 
strong identities. 
Lebanon is marked by a diverse society combining different social groups 
governed by a confessional system.  Thus, differences in orientations and ideologies 
have contributed to the formation of Lebanon’s plural society, whereas direct and 
indirect foreign influences helped in generating sectarian, communal, and 
confessional disputes intensified by vulnerabilities and insecurities.  Different parties 
in the plural society desired strengthen their position within the state for maximizing 
their benefits and expanding their presence through identity formation (identifying 
them as strong and powerful rather than weak and vulnerable).  Because of the 
subsequent inadequate competitive situation, the legitimacy and authority of the state 
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declined due to empowerment of some groups at the expense of others.4 For Michael 
Handel, “The cycles of security and insecurity and of influence and impotence in 
weak states like Lebanon are largely determined by the structure of the international 
system and the position of the state in that system” (as cited in Mubarak, 2003, 2). 
Lebanon has several powerful sectarian and communal groups supported by 
foreign powers, all competing to preserve their position and ensure security for their 
communities.  The excess in dependency on foreign powers for securing interests 
increased the diversity of society and created major security, capacity, and legitimacy 
gaps inside the state.  By weakening state capabilities, chaos and insecurities 
exacerbated and generated bloody civil wars in 1958 and 1975.  The Lebanese state 
lacked the necessary capabilities to prevent conflicts, a result of the excess in loyalty 
to traditional families, mostly sectarian political parties, and sectarian institutions.  
Eventually, this state of affairs undermined state institutional performances and 
effectiveness owing to the advantage of sectarian loyalties over national ones.  As a 
result, deteriorating infrastructural powers and capabilities opened the space wide for 
external interferences and disputes, which ended up in a protracted civil war.5  
Consequently, the insecurity dilemma as presented by Job best captures the actual 
situation of Lebanon.   
 
3.2.2 Behaviors and Actions 
Seeing that Lebanon became a victim of powerful forces, the outcome of the 
events led to different types of conflicts between state and society.  The state needed 
to regain its normal role as a governing entity, whereas communal groups benefitted 
from the weakness and vulnerability of the regime and strengthened their position 
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through developing their own security zones.  The conflict between the state and 
society generated an unusual state of affairs and fostered the weakness of state 
institutions.  Therefore, the legitimate use of coercive force against possible reprisals 
was not possible, as society is growing stronger than the state.  The absence of a ripe 
moment made the achievement of goals impossible.  Despite the fact that the Syrians 
were against any military interventions in solving the Lebanese disputes, the 
deteriorating situation had left them with no other choice6 except to use force.  “The 
final motivation impulse for the Syrian involvement in Lebanon during the crisis was 
the growing concern of Syrian decision-makers with the persisting confessional 
character of Lebanon’s civil war” (Dawisha, 1980, 105).  Consequently, Lebanon’s 
position in accordance to regional and international powers was and is still subject to 
different inquiries.  The weakness of the state and lack of sufficient capabilities turned 
Lebanon into a dependent entity on foreign powers and endowments.  The occurring 
and recurring dramatic incidents left the state with immense burdens resulted in 
insecurities.  The dependence on regional and international powers for securing 
interests increased the prospects of internal disputes and decreased the authority and 
legitimacy of the Lebanese state. 
The situation in Lebanon has not changed much, and remains the subject of 
much research.  There have been extensive studies questioning the status and nature 
of the identity of Lebanon and its position as an influential and decisive entity in 
accordance to regional and international powers.  In spite of all the difficulties and 
continuous dependency on external forces for security and stability, Lebanon has tried 
to emerge as a sovereign state.  Unfortunately, the impact of the political parties and 
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the presence of a confessional system increased the deteriorating situation instead of 
enhancing security and stability factors.  
 
3.2.3 Political Parties and their Effects 
Kamal Salibi notes that:  
If the various factions are to lay down their arms and live in peace and full 
co-operation as citizens of one country, the Lebanese will first have to 
reach a consensus on what makes them a nation or political community, 
and this can only be achieved if they manage to agree on a common vision 
of their past (1988, 17-18). 
Two major political parties were present at the formation of the modern state 
in Lebanon: the Constitutional Bloc headed by Bishara El Khoury and other 
prominent Muslim Leaders who favored Pan Arabism, and the National Bloc headed 
by Emile Edde (who spearheaded Lebanese Nationalism) and was supported by the 
French.  A major dilemma dominated the political scene and aided in fragmenting the 
social structure by increasing insecurities among vulnerable groups.  It created a sense 
of unrest and chaos combined with massive vulnerabilities and threats, which led to a 
hesitant and unstable national security.  Consequently, “the role and capacities of the 
state become dependent on factors that falls beyond the state’s domestic control” 
(Khazen, 2000, 91). 
Hence, potent elites supported by foreign powers controlled the decision-
making processes, increased the levels of dependency on external actors, and opened 
Figure 3.1: Illustrates the divergence in 
interests. 
Figure 3.2: Illustrates confrontation due to 
divergence in interests. 
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the domestic space widely for other communities and groups to organize and establish 
a variety of political parties.  The first non-Maronite group attempted to establish an 
active political party, the Progressive Socialist Party or (PSP), was a Druze party led 
by Kamal Jumblatt.  The PSP forced itself on Lebanese political society and played a 
prominent role in shaping the new political structure and engaged in bloody clashes 
with other parties in some instances, and formed alliances based on common interests 
with others.  The Phalange Party is a family-based party established and led by the 
Gemayel family.  It later played a significant role in shaping and directing the 
Lebanese political scene.  It was one of the major actors in mobilizing a large section 
of the Maronite community during the civil war, and it stood against the alliance 
between the PSP and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The emergence of these political parties manifested the ethnic and sectarian 
nature of the confessional political system, and substantiated the loyalty to traditional 
families, sectarian communities, and ethnic political parties.  According to Dawisha 
(1980), since the seventies, the nature of the domestic dispute transformed into a 
conflict between the left wing, where the Muslims joined forces with the Palestinians, 
against the right wing incorporating different Christian political parties.  The 
communal disputes developed into ideological and political ones, or what is perceived 
as the left wing versus the right wing; on top of that the sectarian communities 
impeded national identity formation and generated different gaps (security, 
legitimacy, and capacity) instead.  Progressively, the situation revealed the weakness 
of the state in favor of the absence of social cohesiveness and deteriorating 
institutional capacities.  This weakness invited foreign interferences as a security 
strategy on one hand and preservation of material and non-material interests in the 
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region on the other hand.  Obviously, the French mandate in Lebanon and Syria is 
evidence of direct intervention and political interference, which after independence 
had transformed into indirect interference under the veil of friendship relationship.  
“In 1920, the French annexed different parts of the former Vilayets (or Ottoman 
provinces) of Beirut and Damascus to the territory of the old Lebanese Mutesarrifate, 
and so created the State of Greater Lebanon within the present frontiers” (Salibi, 
1988, 17). 
Another category of political parties was influenced and dominated by 
regional powers and placed their loyalties at the service of the regional interests.  
They were categorized as small political parties due to their minimal role in the 
Lebanese political arena.  Youssef Ibrahim Yazbek and Fouad Al Shameli founded 
the Lebanese Communist Party in 1924, and Antun Saadeh founded the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party in 1932.  The Lebanese government opposed these parties because 
of their extraneous Lebanese ideologies and political orientations.  The threat exerted 
by these parties, frustrated decision-makers in Lebanon, as well as some international 
powers.  As a response to the continuous agitation by the government and the 
execution of its founder Antun Saadeh in July 1949, the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP) was accused of assassinating the late Prime Minister Riad Al Solh 
during his visit to Jordan in July 1951.  
During the early stages of state formation, the regional powers, especially 
Syria was occupied with its own internal and external conflicts.  At that time, French 
mandate policies influenced the identity of the state.  Later the situation was reversed 
and circumstances allowed opportunities for more regional interferences and 
dominations.  Some parties in Lebanon perceived regional interferences as 
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unfavorable, jeopardizing internal cohesion and stability.  Accordingly, political 
parties alone have no great role, whereas sectarian groups are the major players and 
the dynamic engine in defining and setting the rules of the game.  By combining the 
two actors together, the truth may reveal and expose the hidden forces behind 
domestic socio-political activities. 
Once more, referring to the historical background is important for 
understanding contemporary developments including identity formation, state-society 
relations, and decision-making process, seeing that historical residues have a direct 
and indirect impact on current politics.  Farid Al Khazen notes that: 
The legitimacy of the National Pact was based on a dual assumption: 
Muslim opposition to Arab unity -especially with Syria- and Christian 
opposition to the French mandate.  Instead, Lebanon was to have an ‘Arab 
face’ and to adopt a neutral position in inter-Arab politics.  It was now the 
task of the Muslims to ‘Arabise’ Lebanon’s Christians, while the Latter 
would seek to ‘Lebanise’ their Muslim compatriots (2000, 39).  
Because exclusion and discrimination diminishes the importance of the political 
game, it is considered as one of the determinant factors in measuring the strength and 
weakness of the relationship between institutions, parties, and communities.  
Restricting the political role of the Shiite community and other groups increased the 
gap between the state and society.  Such a discriminatory act has generated a sense of 
Figure 3.3: Power sharing and balance of power are significant 
factors for building a cohesive society and enhancing the unified 
living. 
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frustration and increased the vulnerability of a deprived community, which had no 
significant domestic, regional, or foreign support.   
These incidents contributed to increasing insecurity levels through deepening 
internal divisions followed by an increase in foreign intervention in Lebanon’s 
domestic arena.  Because sectarian identities are laden with bigotry and superfluous 
convictions, they helped increase the weakness of the Lebanese state and prevented 
the establishment of a cohesive society.  Despite the patriotic phrases, which call for 
independence and sovereignty, Lebanon was and is still considered an open society 
dominated by divergent sectarian forces, which serve the interests of external actors.  
The weakness of the state and social frustrations increased the gap between the state 
and society. 
Discriminatory policies among and between different sectarian and political 
groups mobilized the oppressed communities, such as the Shiites, and encouraged 
them to enhance their status.  During early 1970s, the Shiites managed to increase 
their engagement in the political arena and established the Amal Movement headed 
by Imam Musa al-Sader.  Al-Sader tried to grant the deprived community some of its 
national rights and was an advocate of national coexistence based on equality.  
Consequently, the Shiites were involved more in shaping the political decision-
making process and became good allies of the Syrian regime.  “President Asad 
developed an interest in the Shia community, which had become the single largest 
confession in Lebanon.  He cultivated his relationship with the powerful Shia leader 
Imam Musa al-Sader” (Rabil, 2003, 50).  This was intensified with the rise of 
Hizballah as a resistance and political party in early 1980s.  Hizballah tried to fill the 
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gap that the Lebanese army and government could not in protecting and securing the 
southern regions.  As Jeremy Jones notes:  
The presence in Lebanon of a well-organized Shia Islamist movement, 
engaged in the political process, contributing positively to social 
development among its constituents, offers hope that Hizballah could be a 
genuine participant in the negotiation of political change in Lebanon.  In 
short, it has been claimed already that the so-called terrorists may turn out 
to be the most convincing democrats (2007, 117). 
 
Lebanon’s confessional plural society created diverse political orientations, 
aimed at preserving the interest of different sectarian groups and communities.  
Consequently, the lack of a specific war agenda blocked the establishment of a 
powerful military capable of protecting the society from enemy attacks (Khazen, 
2000).  The Lebanese government never granted the military the importance that other 
regional states have given it, thereby relying on regional and domestic bargaining 
aimed at securing and stabilizing the state.  On the other hand, foreign powers 
impeded attempts to provision the Lebanese army with necessary weapons, mainly for 
regional security purposes aimed at maintaining the regional hegemony of the Israeli 
military forces.  Unfortunately, these approaches never operate properly in a region 
Figure 3.5:  Discrimination and exclusion inside the society. Figure 3.4:  Major constituencies of the Lebanese society  
(Influential sectarian groups). 
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teeming with turmoil and hostile neighbors especially within a state combining multi-
communal groups and confessional political interests.  The weakness of the military 
establishment provided the opportunity for the political parties to proliferate in the 
form of armed militias. 
This situation reinforced differences and generated more complexities than the 
state could endure, creating security gaps, which led to a protracted civil war.  It aided 
in increasing insecurity levels accompanied by excess hatred among and between the 
diverse communal and confessional groups within the state.  Such attitudes were the 
result of different agendas prioritized by private interests with arbitrary political 
decisions.  Regrettably, political choices in Lebanon are still subject to regional and 
international pressures. 
Do Lebanese show any readiness to overcome their disputes in order to live in 
harmony?  Is it possible that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon can resolve all 
Lebanese internal disputes?  These questions have no definite answers, and are left to 
future circumstances. 
 
3.2.4 The Withdrawal 
After the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon 
became an even more fragmented society than before.  The withdrawal of Syrian 
forces from Lebanon opened a new dialectic concerning the real identity of Lebanon.  
Arbitrary accusations with no clear evidence accused Syria as the main suspect 
behind the assassination.  Recently, the accusations turned to convict Hizballah as a 
major suspect by referring to two main articles published by the French newspaper 
“Le Figaro” and the German newspaper “Der Spiegel” (Matha Ba’ad, T.V. 
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Interview, 31 March 2010).  The arbitrary accusations aim to destabilize the internal 
situation in Lebanon and create a state of turmoil by reinforcing the division between 
and among Lebanese communities.  There is no doubt that the dramatic incidents that 
took place were supported by super powers in order to subvert the region chiefly after 
the disgraceful fall and withdrawal of the Israeli army and its Lebanese allies in the 
spring of the year 2000. 
Both Lebanon and Syria have common concerns towards the future of the 
region and the stability of the overall situation in view of internal and external 
challenges.  Historical attempts to design a foreign policy based on mutual interests to 
overcome the fragile Lebanese socio-political and religious structure; alignments and 
configurations have failed (Rabil, 2003).  The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 
2005 aimed to decrease the tension on one side and to achieve the implementation of 
international resolutions primarily the UNSCR (1559), which calls for the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from Lebanese territories with no conditions.  In addition to the 
UNSCR, Bassel Salloukh argues that, “US Secretary of State’s Colin Powell’s 
demands with regard to Lebanon included the withdrawal of all Syrian troops, and 
end to Syrian interference, the demobilization and disarmament of Hizbullah… and 
the deployment of Lebanese Army over all Lebanese territories…” (Salloukh, 2009b, 
164).  Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon ultimately aimed at containing some of the 
international and regional pressures against Damascus in the aftermath of the Hariri 
assassination. 
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3.3 Syria: Historical Development and Policy Perspectives 
In 1924, the fragmented Syrian states were gathered to form the Syrian State 
under the supervision of the French High Commissariat.  The majority of the Syrian 
population condemned the presence of the French mandate and demanded Syria’s 
immediate independence.  Later in 1925, a general revolution erupted demanding the 
creation of a provisional Syrian government.  In 1936 the French proposed and signed 
separate treaties with both Syria and Lebanon in order to transfer authority to national 
powers and to grant the two states the right of membership in the League of Nations.  
Unfortunately, the treaties were never ratified or implemented.  Thus, the 
deteriorating situation led to more insurgencies, which continued until 1943.  Finally, 
real independence took place in 1946 after forcing the French troops to withdraw 
from the region (Hourani, 1946). 
Searching for and shaping the real identity of the newly independent state was 
the next mission awaiting Syrian decision-makers.  According to Dawisha (1980), the 
Baath Party emerged in 1954, and dominated the nationalist camp.  The Baathists 
tried to convey their mission and goals by raising pan-national slogans, “One Arab 
nation with an eternal mission” (Dawisha, 1980, 19).  After the military coup in 
February 1963, the Baath Party took over power in Syria.  After the emergence of 
deep disputes and intensive struggles inside the party, General Hafiz Asad staged his 
‘corrective movement’ in November 1970, and was subsequently elected president in 
February 1971.  Asad adopted moderate stances in shaping domestic and foreign 
policies in order to normalize and stabilize the internal situation after several years 
filled with turmoil.  Consequently, his election ended an era full of threats and 
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vulnerabilities promoting insecurities, and started a promising period establishing 
stability and progress. 
The geographical location of Syria helped in shaping its vital and strategic role 
in the region, and “constituted a major determinant of the country’s behavior towards 
Lebanon” (Dawisha, 1980, 37).  Syria was and is still considered an interactive hub, 
which connects the east with the west, and is central to the geopolitics of the region.  
Syria, historically labeled ‘Billad al-Sham,’ played an immense role in shaping 
political development in the Arab east.  However, as Raymund Hinnebusch points 
out, “the dominance of Syria’s regional environment by threats and constraints 
inevitably makes security a prime preoccupation” (in Korany and Dessouki, 1991, 
375).  A sense of superiority accorded the Syrian leaders excess confidence under the 
influence of foreign threats especially that foreign policies in Third World countries 
designate the leader as the be-all and end-all (Korany & Dessouki, 1991).    
 
3.3.1 Political Orientation 
After gaining independence in 1946, Syria started an extensive search for 
defining its authentic identity and configuring the overall status of the state.  The 
egalitarian and nationalist ideologies applied by the Baath Party, which dominated the 
decision-making process, aimed to captivate the peasants and ordinary citizens.  
Dawisha argues that:   
The Baath Party… was the core institutional unit in the Syrian political 
system, and although in theory the Baath party was supposed to share 
power with the other parties in the Progressive National Front, in reality 
the Baath remained the primary institutional actor (1980, 45). 
Syria was thus ruled by a powerful regime, supported by a strong political 
party alongside a cohesive and stable state structure.  Accordingly, the version of the 
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Baath Party under the command of President Asad differed from the version of the 
Baath Party under the command of General Amine Al-Hafiz and Salah Jadid.  During 
the early rule of Baath Party in 1963, General Amine Al-Hafiz implemented highly 
oppressive policies against feudal families, industrialist, and merchants.  On that 
account, he aimed to nationalize all the sectors by implementing leftist orientations 
and approaches (Dawisha, 1980).  Deep disputes between the two leaders led to a 
bloody coup and a split inside the Baath Party.  In turn, the split led to the emergence 
of a new leadership headed by Neo-Marxist civilians commanded by Dr. Nur Al-Din 
Atassi, and as a result, Michel Aflaq, the original founder of the Baath Party, accused 
the new leadership of attempting to deviate from the party’s real orientations and 
basic principles. 
After the humiliating defeat against the Israeli troops in 1967, a new rivalry 
emerged between Salah Jadid and General Hafiz Asad.  General Asad favored 
moderate attempts to shape the domestic, regional, and international policies, on top 
of that condemning all extremism.7 The Corrective Movement led by General Asad 
aimed to reform the institutional sector and implement moderate foreign and domestic 
policies.  He saw the state as self-dependant with less dependence on foreign powers 
(Dawisha, 1980).  “There is no doubt that under the rule of President Asad, Syria has 
experienced the most stable period in her post independence history” (Dawisha, 1980, 
25).  President Asad established the People’s Council and later the National 
Progressive Front combining the Baathist and Non-Baathist groups as a sign of 
integration and acceptance of all orientations and ideologies.  He needed to control 
the state, and accordingly was obliged to include all small political parties under his 
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own tutelage for supervising their actions in order to prevent any possible conspiracy 
against his rule. 
The new regime under Asad’s rule promoted a new phase in Syrian decision-
making and policy orientations, especially with neighboring countries like Lebanon.  
However, Syrian foreign policy faced a gap between capabilities and objectives 
(Korany & Dessouki, 1991).  Domestically, Asad tried to unify the decision-making 
processes by minimizing the powers and capabilities of any possible internal rivals.  
This was an attempt to build a cohesive society for serving the interests of the state as 
a whole.  He built a robust state with powerful military capabilities and strong 
institutional infrastructure, and developed the agricultural, industrial, educational, 
military, health and service sectors.  The reform process empowered state institutions, 
which in turn increased state powers. 
Syria developed an influential role in Lebanon before and also after the 
outbreak of the latter’s civil war.  The relationship between Lebanon and Syria could 
be categorized under the security complex principle as presented by Buzan and 
discussed in chapter two.  The main concept emphasized the importance of security 
concerns, especially those dominating neighboring and close states.  Tension and 
disarray in one state can tremendously affect the national security of other states with 
interdependent relationships.  Definitely, situations depend on the factors that regulate 
their actions and reactions whether governed by amity and/or enmity.  Dawisha points 
out that, “in addition to the obvious historical roots,” between both states, “the 
geographic factor comprised an important strategic dimension, which had 
considerable influence on the formulation and implementation of Syria’s policies 
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towards Lebanon, particularly as these related to questions of defense and military 
activity” (1980, 38). 
Asad’s speeches deliberately discussed and emphasized the importance of 
preserving the national securities of Lebanon and Syria and minimizing any possible 
unfavorable situations.  The civil war in Lebanon and the common threats from Israeli 
attacks were the main motivators behind Syria’s policy towards Lebanon.  During the 
early phases of the civil war, Syrian policy toward Lebanon was motivated by a 
number of value-based [Syrian] impulses:  
Conviction of an imperialist and Zionist conspiracy, the indivisibility of 
Syria and Lebanon, and concern over the societal unity of Lebanon, a total 
rejection of military solutions inflicted by one party over the other, and 
attitudinal antipathy against religious and sectarian conflicts (Dawisha, 
1980, 106).   
This reflected the way Syrian decision-makers think about Lebanon.  As Dawisha has 
noted, “Syria is concerned with defending Lebanon and Lebanon is concerned with 
defending Syria… It is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon’s security in its 
broadest sense and Syria’s security” (Dawisha, 1980, 72).  Consequently, Syrian 
decision-makers created a special committee for monitoring the development of 
events in Lebanon.  High commanders headed by the president himself supervised, 
and directed all the decisions issued by this special committee.  Such an attempt 
emphasizes the importance of preserving security in Lebanon in order to reduce the 
prospects of spreading conflicts.  Syrian decision-makers viewed and dealt with this 
matter as a strategic security issue, demanding constant and accurate assessment of 
the situation.  It was not a matter of choice for the Syrians; Lebanese concerns were 
situated at the heart of the Syrian decision-making process and provisions.  
Consequently, “Syria has increasingly given way to a conventional policy of raison 
 46 
d’état, which seeks the defense, power, and prestige of the Syrian state within the 
existing regional state system” (Hinnebusch in Korany and Dessouki, 1991, 378).   
 
3.3.2 Policies and Decision-Making  
Decisions are not just aimless words and narrated statements; they dominate 
and regulate the function of the institutions and progress of the state.  The arbitrary 
formulation of regulations without accurate and intensive study of circumstances and 
conditions can generate misperceptions and confusions, and promote undesired 
disarrays among and between states or within the state itself.  Accordingly to 
Dawisha, decisions can be divided into three categories based on three factors: time, 
spectrum of initiation-reaction, and a scale of importance (1980).  Thus, “they are 
characterized as strategic, tactical, and implementing” (Dawisha, 1980, 3).  The 
analysis of internal as well as external factors can minimize the prospects of wrong 
assumptions and inaccurate choices.  Syrian decision-makers attempted to design 
foreign policies stressing on national interests, benefits, and the safety of the state by 
subsuming internal as well as external forces.  Thus, they integrated a clear set of 
definitive plans for assessing perceptions and behaviors, which affected state 
relationships as well as the general development process.  
The geographical location of Syria designates it as a vital and active actor in 
the Middle East.  Its unfriendly relations during the 1960s with almost all bordering 
countries like Turkey, Iraq, and Israel prompted Syria to sustain a friendly 
relationship with Lebanon, especially given that Lebanon is considered a protective 
shield, which borders a great portion of the southern, south western, and western 
Syrian territory.  Nevertheless, as Dawisha contends,  
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Syrian decision-makers have tended to consider the mountains of southern 
Lebanon as natural defensive frontiers that could be utilized to stop or 
crucially delay attacks… It was in this context that President Asad made 
his often-quoted statement relating to the interdependence of Syrian and 
Lebanese security (1980, 38). 
Syrian decision-makers constantly promoted the importance of the Lebanese 
case for them by focusing on the common interests represented by defeating a 
common foe Israel.  Thus, focusing on the proposition of brotherly relations and 
depending on the principle of the older and mature actor has to take care of the 
smaller and fragile one.  For that reason, Lebanon is perceived as a pivotal factor in 
Syrian foreign policy, which requires extensive attention and great care.  They stress 
on enhancing coordination and cooperation for supporting Arab issues and deterring 
external threats.  Their deep conviction in unifying security goals benefits and 
sustains the Arab position in general, and the Syrian one in particular.  For the Syrian 
regime, stabilizing and normalizing relations with Lebanon advances the position of 
Syria in the regional and international arena, and on the other hand aims to preserve 
the security and stability of both Lebanon and Syria, seeing that, “the structures of the 
Baath state are a formidable machine for harnessing society to the regime’s foreign 
policy goals” (Hinnebusch in Korany and Dessouki, 1991, 390).  The Syrian regime 
needed to create harmony and congruity among and between neighboring countries, 
especially with the emergence of rival states threatening the Syrian regime and 
causing internal harm and dissonance at a time Syria was dependent on Arab aid and 
facing economic instabilities, which prevented proper achievement of its foreign 
policy objectives (Hinnebusch in Korany and Dessouki, 1991). 
Alternately, the Syrian regime designed a defensive foreign policy depending 
on the integration and incorporation of all vital sectors to safeguard the Syrian 
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territories as a first step and as a second to preserve stability, progress, and 
development of the state.  The dramatic sequence of incidents in 2005 altered the 
position of the Syrian regime and forced them to revise all polices, ideologies, and 
orientations designed towards Lebanon.  The once brotherly relations based on values 
and interests turned into defensive policies and formal diplomatic relationships.   
 
3.3.3 State Capabilities and State Policies 
Migdal argues that, “Understanding the differing abilities of states to achieve 
social control, and in particular the difficulties many Third World states have had in 
their own societies, demands an appreciation of the nature of the resistance states 
have encountered” (Migdal, 1988, 40).  Syria’s process of state formation allowed for 
the institutionalization of a powerful regime, enjoying substantial autonomy from 
society. 
Syria is a one party regime, whereas Lebanon is multi-party one in a 
confessional context.  Consequently, the diversity in political orientations in Lebanon 
has led to an array of perceptions and inclinations unlike the situation in Syria.  Syrian 
citizens are loyal to the Syrian state alone, and because of that “the political apparatus 
– the single party and its ‘mass organization’ – which incorporates a large segment of 
the population, has mobilized indispensible support for the regime” (Hinnebusch in 
Korany and Dessouki, 1991, 390).  For some Lebanese parties, Syria is an essential 
actor to preserve security in Lebanon and the region, while others view the presence 
of Syria as a major threat.  However, the Syrians consider Lebanon a major security 
concern, and their attempts to solve Lebanese internal disputes are perceived by some 
Lebanese parties as direct interferences in Lebanese domestic affairs.  Historical 
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factors and skewed personal convictions have designated Syria as a major threat to 
internal solidarity.  Unfortunately, this reality cannot be dismissed by the Syrian 
decision-makers, seeing that Lebanese opponents are also partners in the Lebanese 
regime and can be engaged in oppressive actions with the Syrian opposition to 
devastate the current Syrian regime. 
The lack of balanced relationships demanded extra alertness from all groups.  
As a result, friendly relations have no place in such tense conditions; on the contrary, 
interests and security preferences are the dominant values.  The weakness and 
diversity of the political scene in Lebanon led to an increase in Syrian interferences in 
internal and domestic affairs driven by deep concerns and intense intimidations from 
the deteriorating situation in the neighboring state.  Obviously, the Syrian reaction is 
derived from an imminent threat, which might negatively influence Syrian national 
security and threaten internal stability and cohesion. 
During the Lebanese civil war, Syrians weighed Lebanese internal disputes 
and affairs as a priority to be taken into consideration.  Strategies were designed by 
Syria to secure its borders and minimize the prospects of threats to their national 
Figure 3.6: Illustrates differences in orientation toward the Syrian state. 
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security ensuing from excess numbers of displaced individuals, rivalry groups, and 
enemy attacks.  The Syrians aimed to increase social stability, economic progress, and 
military capabilities to enhance domestic cohesion. 
In turn, Syrian attempts and plans intimidated some groups and relieved others 
inside Lebanon, as well as regional and international political powers.  It affected both 
the government and the non-official sectors represented by the public.  Such 
coalitions resulted in an increase in tension and excess in security gaps.  Inevitably, 
the Syrians were alerted and divided the situation in Lebanon into three major phases 
in order to assess incidents and evaluate circumstances as a preparatory stage for their 
intervention.  During Phase One (18 January till 15 March 1976), Syrian decision-
makers supported their leftist allies represented by an alliance between Muslims and 
Palestinians.  They ordered the Saiqa and the PLO to stop the advancement of the 
leftist Arab Army from heading towards the Palace of President Suleiman Franjieh.  
During Phase Two (15 March till 31 May 1976), their orientation shifted towards 
helping the rightist Christian groups.  As a result, they decided to stop the negotiation 
phase and use force (military intervention) against their previous leftist allies.  During 
Phase Three (31 September 1976), the Syrians managed to defeat the leftist parties 
and end the conflict with them (Dawisha, 1980).  Despite the deep convictions and 
commitment to protect the Palestinian causes, the Syrians selected the Christians as 
their new allies basing their choice on common intimidation from the increase in the 
powers and military capabilities of the Palestinians from one side (Dawisha, 1980) 
and a threat from Israeli counterattacks against the persistent powerful presence of the 
Palestinians on the other side (Rabil, 2003).  Clearly, politics has no friends, and thus 
political decision-makers and parties are constantly searching for alliances, which 
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provide them with security and preserve their geopolitical interests as well as their 
status. 
In 2005 international pressures accompanied by domestic reprisal led to the 
quick withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and promoted the end of the 
presence of Syrian powers on Lebanese soil.  Bassel Salloukh argues that, 
“Washington was bent on using Lebanon to isolate the Syrian Regime, Damascus was 
determined to use Lebanon to abort the new regional order” (Salloukh 2009b, 170).  
Foreign pressures empowered some domestic groups against others, and mobilized 
the international community against the Syrian presence and its constant support for 
Hizballah.  This “signaled to Damascus the beginning of a concerted international 
effort to evict Syria from Lebanon, thereby threatening its regional position and 
consequently the survival of the regime” (Salloukh, 2009b, 167).  As a result, foreign 
powers and their domestic allies created political tensions to exhaust Hizballah.  The 
weakness of the fragmented society debilitated the decision-making process.  Syria 
managed to turn defeat in Lebanon into victory by relying on loyal Lebanese allies.  
Syria then started to correct the basis of its relationship with other neighboring 
countries, including Lebanon, in order to enhance its regional and international 
political power and diplomatic relations.  Accordingly, Syria proved to Lebanon as 
well as regional and international actors its capacity as a powerful actor, which cannot 
be easily defeated.  Even though international powers like France, Germany, Spain, 
and other forces were good allies to 14th of March group in Lebanon, they constantly 
sought to normalize their relations with Syria.  As Salloukh notes, “the image of a 
confident President Bashar al-Asad attending the Union for the Mediterranean summit 
in Paris on 13 July 2008, hosting French President Nicolas Sarkozy on 3 August 2008 
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and then gathering in Damascus the leader of France, Qatar and Turkey on 4 
September 2008 underscored the dramatic close to Syria’s regional and international 
isolation” (Salloukh, 2009b, 172).  In this respect, “Syria’s Lebanon policy played a 
central role in this rehabilitation and perhaps Damascus learned belatedly that its 
Lebanese proxies can be far better than the heavy-handed tactics deployed by its own 
army and intelligent services” (Salloukh, 2009b, 172). 
This position clearly derived from the conviction that Syria plays an 
instrumental role in mobilizing and regulating regional politics in the Middle East.  
Syrian state elites favored a foreign policy that responds to geopolitical shifts.  For 
them, positioning the state in accordance to the global structure and regional 
challenges is a priority for determining their security concerns and designing 
defensive policies (Korany & Dessouki, 1991).  Enforcing sanctions on Syria could 
limit the progress of normal relations with other countries, and undermine Syrian 
participation in the regional decision-making process.  After all, Syria possesses 
multiple regional assents. 
 
3.4 Influences and Outcomes 
Political parties are important institutions in regulating behaviors and shaping 
relationships on one hand and helping in deteriorating the situation on the other.  The 
entire situation is under their command, because they regulate the decision-making 
process by defining the rules of the game.  However, situations can change by 
changing orientations, beliefs, and alliances between different and previously 
opposing parties and hence direct and indirect influences can reveal the defects in the 
state structure and stress on the fragile social cohesiveness. 
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The multi-party confessional system in Lebanon increases the diversity of 
society and intensifies the competition and confrontation between and among rival 
groups.  Undoubtedly, diversity promotes divisions, but when combined with general 
awareness and national consciousness, it enriches society.  At this stage, differences 
are not always a sign of conflict.  Unfortunately, differences in Lebanon are a major 
source of political dissention and social fragmentation.  Nonetheless, the lack of 
national consensus and the presence of a confessional system, complicate the situation 
and increase tension. 
The Syrian case is the opposite of the Lebanese situation.  A one party regime 
in Syria dominates and regulates political decisions, and unifies the decision-making 
process.  Although, freedom of expression is restricted, the regime argues that 
exceptional and uncommon circumstances demand such moves in order to preserve 
stability and security in turbulent conditions.8 The one party regime benefits Syria 
internally and serves the interests of the regime, allowing Syria to develop a proactive 
and defensive foreign policy at the same time. 
In Lebanon, the plural and confessional political system institutionalized 
differences and created gaps between the state and society.  Nonetheless, the 
unmanageable interferences of political parties in state institutions and decision-
making jeopardized the development process and undermined the welfare of the state 
by generating infrastructural, security, and legitimacy gaps.  The nature of the 
structure of the state helped in the proliferation of security zones generated by these 
groups who encouraged the empowerment of some parties over others.  Political 
parties benefitted from the weakness of the state and dominated state institutions 
along sectarian lines.  By operating the institutional sector for their own benefit, they 
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have deprived Lebanese citizens from benefitting from what is considered as a natural 
right for them.  The plural and confessional system invited foreign interferences as 
powerful allies necessary for preserving their longevity and status.  By promoting 
discrimination and inequality, they have managed to create a sense of insecurity 
among citizens and undermined the legitimacy of the state. 
Despite the presence of small political parties, the Baath party dominates the 
decision-making process in Syria.  Their role is insignificant in comparison with those 
in Lebanon.  As noted before, the Baath party needed to dominate the decision-
making process and state institutions in order to limit conspiracies from inside and 
from outside the state.  Therefore, the hegemonic approach was necessary for 
preserving and securing the state and society from foreign interferences and internal 
discords.  Past political instability convinced the regime of the necessity to secure the 
state by limiting political plurality and controlling participation.  Although the Syrian 
regime is accused of being undemocratic, it has nevertheless managed to insulate the 
state and society from external and domestic threats.  Accordingly, it has enhanced 
the development process for the general welfare of the state, empowered the military 
and intelligence sector to secure the state from external and internal threats, and 
maintained a prosperous and productive economy.     
 
3.4.1 Socio-Political Forces 
Private interests of sectarian groups regulate the political situation in Lebanon, 
and sectarian diversity accompanied by deep disputes, increases social divisions and 
political stagnation.  However, the dramatic events that took place in 2005 are a clear 
example of the weakness of the Lebanese political system and the strength of the 
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confessional one.  Undoubtedly, the overall situation opened the space for political 
and sectarian discords accompanied by an increase in public strife, which divided the 
society into two extreme opposite camps each believing in different ideologies and 
convictions.  Thus, civilians faced the possibility of becoming subject to manipulation 
by sectarian elites who aimed to achieve their interests. 
As mentioned earlier, alliances between political parties shift according to 
their interests.  This, in turn, threatens to change the balance of the political game and 
affect public interests.9 The outcome of this change could result in dissensions and 
disarrays.  The sense of threat from the Syrians is still a dominant factor in defining 
the relationship between the two states.  Unfortunately, this situation has hurt 
Lebanon on all sectors and levels.  Needless to say the passive reaction of the 
government, aided in increasing chaos and economic stagnation, whereas social 
divisions promoted the failure of the state in Lebanon.  The entire set of factors 
created conflicts, ergo accusing Syria of interfering in Lebanese domestic affairs and 
condemning its role in administering the extension of the presidential duration of 
President Emile Lahoud.  The indirect impact of the Syrian policy in Lebanon is 
channeled through its allies.  “The politics of Syria and Lebanon are not only 
intertwined, but they also offer two related, but perhaps polar examples of the 
functioning of political parties in the region” (Jones, 2007, 85). 
The Syrian role in 2005 promoted awareness of the seriousness of the 
situation.  Accordingly, the response and unpredicted behavior of the Lebanese parties 
antagonized Syria, and unleashed dramatic changes in regional politics.  The 
assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was only a pretext in a bigger 
contest aimed out changing the regional political map and alliances.  Clearly, the 
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change in political alliances in Lebanon aided at forming new political gatherings 
across sectarian groups.10 It is a sign of a new stage in regional politics in general and 
the Lebanese one specifically.  “Nonetheless, Syria has continued to play a leading 
role in Lebanon’s domestic politics, and its army and security forces effectively held 
at least parts of the country as a result of its intervention in the civil war from 1975” 
(Jones, 2007, 89). 
The chaotic situation was well planned and derived from a deep conviction of 
the importance of leaving the situation in Lebanon as unstable as possible.  The 
international community represented by UNSCR (1559),11the foreign embassies and 
delegations in addition to some domestic Lebanese political parties supported by 
powerful foreign forces exerted pressures on local officials.  They aimed at 
implementing UNSCR (1559), which called for disarming Hizballah, and for 
enforcing sanctions on Syria in order to stop supporting and providing the resistance 
with the necessary equipments and funds.  By disarming Hizballah and isolating 
Syria, they sought to usher forth the “New Middle East”. 
In order to minimize casualties and undesirable effects, the Syrians chose to 
withdraw from Lebanon in a peaceful way and consolidate the domestic arena.  
Nonetheless, they aimed at safeguarding Syrian influence in the region and minimize 
possible confrontations with neighboring countries.  Confrontations incubate 
menacing forces capable of jeopardizing their relationships with other Arab states in 
general and between Lebanon and Syria in particular. 
It is therefore understandable that Syria has established a more stable state 
than Lebanon, despite their claimed interdependence based on mutual relations.  
Although state structure, as mentioned earlier, is a pivotal component, which 
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distinguishes Lebanon from Syria, it is not the only one.  National consciousness and 
consensus, the existence of a cohesive nation, and loyalty to the state are the only 
protection from state collapse and external interventions. 
A plural society in Lebanon cannot be blamed for creating conflicts.  Many 
states worldwide are as diverse as Lebanon and even more, and they manage to live in 
harmony and peace.  Therefore, diversity is not the problem in itself, but the main 
obstacle is situated at the core of the irreconcilable interests combined with the lack of 
national consciousness and a sense of loyalty plus the domination of a confessional 
system.  National coexistence represented by an agreement between Christian 
communities and Muslim communities as stated by the Taif accord of 1989, can 
reduce the prospects of insecurities and vulnerabilities to a certain extent.  Thus, 
building trust between communities and enhancing nationhood can be achieved, but 
are the concerned actors willing to forget and forgive?  Lebanese communities are the 
only authorized entities who decide which kind of Lebanon they want.  Despite their 
diversity, national unity and the survival of the state are priorities, because without a 
strong and capable state, identities and authorities are subject to extinction.   
 
3.5 A Legacy of External Interventions 
Lebanon has a long legacy with external interventions by regional as well as 
international powers.  The geographical location and the nature of the population 
distinguish Lebanon and make it a strategic destination and a focal point in the region.  
As Migdal notes, 
“The territory of one of the states with the least social control of all, 
Lebanon, served as a playground for three non-Lebanese armies in the 
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1970 and 1980s in addition to a gaggle of non-state militias, gangs, and 
international and multinational forces…” (Migdal, 1988, 24). 
The lack of capabilities and the weakness of the state expose Lebanon to 
various pressures.  For that reason, regional and international pressures endanger the 
stability of state-society relations and generate different gaps.  Distinguishing between 
the intensity and type of these forces is essential for better comprehension and 
awareness.    
 
3.5.1 Regional and International Forces 
The interactive relation with the surrounding institutes the state as both a 
recipient and a benefactor of direct and/or indirect, regional and/or international 
forces.  As a result, statesmen benefit most due to their high status and ultimate 
power.  And in turn, their close loyal allies benefit as well.  Such international and 
regional forces make the most of the situation and try to expand their powers inside 
the state, so they turned into true mobilizers of the domestic decision-making process 
due to partial or total dependence on their assistance and expertise.  As Kalevi Holsti 
notes,  
Governors and claimants to authority use the state for their own private 
purposes, sell offices, and purchase loyalty through patrimonial offerings.  
Bureaucrats use their positions to enhance their wealth, to provide jobs for 
their families and friends, and to impose various forms of illegal taxation 
(Holsti, 2004, 57). 
Those political parties own capabilities and potentials made available by different 
regional and international forces to secure their interests and expand their ambitions.  
Thus, corruption prevails as an effective means for deepening disputes and widening 
gaps between the state and society, and especially the corruption of statesmen in 
Lebanon and the ineffectiveness of the institutions.  International and regional forces 
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benefit more from this situation and help in increasing the weakness of the state by 
promoting and reinforcing the opportunity for excess in interference and dependency 
factors.  Khazen emphasizes this point by arguing that: 
In terms of state-society relations, the outcome of this contradictory 
mechanism translated into a low degree of stateness in Lebanon and a 
permanent dependence of state on the multi-communal structure of power 
within society… In Lebanon’s regional order with various types of 
intervention by external powers have taken place (Khazen, 2000, 92-94). 
The dysfunctional situation in Lebanon demands serious actions in order to 
prevent both regional and international forces from further interfering in domestic 
affairs.  Syria’s intervention in Lebanon in 1976 aimed to secure its geopolitical 
interests and maintain friendly relations, whereas Israel’s first invasion in 1978 and 
the second one in 1982 sought to expand its own geopolitical interests, which allowed 
it to gain a foothold in Lebanon.  The deployment of UNIFIL troops in 1978 worked 
toward fulfilling claimed values such as securing the borders and participating in 
peace keeping and peace building missions. 
During 2005, Lebanon was transformed into a playground for international 
powers aspiring to mobilize both sectarian political parties and civil society.  This 
resulted in an increase in tension inside the country.  Internal turbulence led to an 
escalation of insecurity levels and a drop in legitimacy rates.  All parties searched for 
chances to increase their gains and benefits.  On this account, international forces 
increased sanctions on Syria.  They centralized their efforts to subjugate the regime 
and enforce the Syrian leadership to cooperate with them against some undesired 
Lebanese parties and political groups. 
By isolating Syria and unleashing a propaganda campaign against Iran, 
international and regional actors intend to diminish the credibility of major regional 
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players and enhance the situation of others.  Nevertheless, the main goal behind these 
strategies is to undermine the state and create communal disputes.  Without 
delineating defects and reinforcing open and transparent dialogues between the 
disputant parties, trust can never find a place, and instead insecurities continue to 
overrule proper relations, decisions, and actions.  
  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the nature of the relationship between Lebanon and 
Syria, starting from a historical analysis of the current situation.  The conflict in 2005 
between Lebanon and Syria jeopardized their so-called brotherly relations and 
affected the daily lives of ordinary citizens from both sides, and resulted in a stagnant 
political, economic, and social state of affairs.  Foreign interference was a major actor 
in mobilizing and provoking political parties, confessional groups, and social 
communities, thus performing the role of a two-sided agent with multiple faces, 
combining the virtuous who is ready to help and the odious with malevolent 
intentions.  Therefore, besides the stimulation of internal rivalries between contending 
parties, they endanger and threaten the normal historical relationship between the two 
states.  The next chapter discusses the ranges of insecurities in Lebanon and Syria 
from the existentialist and normative perspectives.  It also highlights the importance 
of the psycho-social analysis in interpreting institutional, political, and social 
relationships.   
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Chapter Four 
The Consequences of the Insecurity Dilemma in  
Lebanon and Syria 
4.1 Introduction 
Because insecurities have effects across borders, the maintenance of the 
relationship between Lebanon and Syria demands extensive collaboration from both 
sides.  For that reason, the decision-making process and the structure of the political 
system alone do not constitute effective tools for preserving the security of the state.  
Attitudes and behaviors of the executive bodies, as well as society, are essential 
complementary factors for generating cohesive societies and secure states.  This 
interactive relationship between different agents and the availability of the required 
resources influence the performance and function of state institutions.  Therefore, 
insecurities can be affected by behavioral attitudes performed by individuals, 
especially statesmen and state elites who possess the ability to motivate and mobilize 
society and enforce regulations. 
Unlike the normative, the existentialist approach interprets and perceives 
insecurities from a different perspective.  Human existence, freedom, and survival 
supersede regulations and norms.  Despite the importance of norms in regulating 
societies, human progress remains the ultimate goal.  On top of that, human 
consciousness, harmony, and mutual respect turn to essential requirements for 
regulating societies and diminishing insecurities.  The insecurity dilemma, as 
discussed in chapter two, includes though in an indirect manner, both the existentialist 
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as well as the normative approaches.  Thereby, it explains when and how insecurities 
emerge from explicit and implicit levels in order to distinguish between the nature of 
actions and reactions of state and society.  Additionally, it discloses the features of the 
state-society relationship, as well as the causes of security gaps.  Nevertheless, such a 
critical approach requires the appropriate and ripe moment to close the gap between 
the state and society.  The importance of ripeness is reflected in minimizing 
insecurities and resolving conflicts between the disputing parties.  Thus, the proper 
function and progress of state institutions depend on coordination and cooperation 
between and among all parties from different backgrounds. 
This chapter discusses and assesses the impact and influence of insecurities on 
the general situation of the state.  As a first step, studying insecurities from the 
existentialist and normative approaches is necessary to understand the important role 
humans and norms play in defining situations and creating tensions.  The next step 
emphasizes the importance of the implicit and explicit distinction, which focuses on 
the importance of intentions, goals, and gains between the interacting agents.  It 
highlights the main purpose behind their attempted actions and reactions.  The third 
step discusses the importance of the ripe moment in resolving disputes and regulating 
relationships as necessary conditions for building cohesive and democratic societies.  
The fourth step highlights the role of political parties in mobilizing society, and 
consequently affecting the progress and function of state institutions.  Therefore, 
circumstances and decisions determine what source and type of power could be 
utilized, and whether soft power or hard power is more effective in curtailing 
insecurities and rebuilding societies.  Finally, the fifth step in this chapter emphasizes 
the significance of the psycho-social effect on the state in general and society in 
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particular.  However, the social and psychological impact on individuals and their 
interactive relationship determines the levels and intensity of disputes, which in the 
first place results in insecurities.   
 
4.2 The Range of Insecurities in Lebanon and Syria 
Realists argue that: 
Statesmen are granted too little autonomy and too little room to maneuver, 
and the decision-making process is seemingly devoid of human volition.  
Human agents are pawns of a bloodless system that looms over them, a 
structure whose functioning they do not understand and the mechanics of 
which they only dimly perceive.  Statesmen are faced with an endless 
array of constraints and few opportunities.  It is as if they are engaged in a 
global game, a game called power politics, and they are unable to change 
the rules even if they so desire (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, 83-84). 
Consequently, the impact of decisions and policies, regardless of time, place, 
or space, affects the range of insecurities.12 The change in the essence of the 
relationship between Lebanon and Syria resulted in severe tensions.  Interests alone 
have replaced what was assumed to be a brotherly relationship, based on mutual 
values and interests. 
Such an ideological and perceptual transformation led to destabilizing 
relationships followed by an increase in security gaps between the two states.  A 
possible third party seeking benefits reinforces the change in order to preserve its 
dominant existence and interests in the region as well.  Their role is vital in defining 
intentions and interests due to their ability to generate instabilities and insecurities.  
Both states faced obscure destinies, but the intensity and impact of change affected 
Lebanon more than Syria.  Several factors aided in obtaining such results including: 
1) the difference in the nature of the regime in power, defines change according to the 
levels of legitimacy gained from citizens, which in turn affects the intensity of the 
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authority required for outlining the relations with foreign powers and implementing 
regulations; 2) state structure, institutional, and infrastructural capacities, 3) the 
strength and weakness of the relationship between the state and society.  Despite all 
obstacles and disputes, historical coherence and cultural bonds remain powerful tools 
for regaining normal relations.  Reinforcing relationships decrease the prospects of 
insecurities generated by dominant political, confessional, and sectarian parties, 
which resist all attempts for improving the relationship between the two countries.  
However, despite the fact that a diverse society indicates different orientations and 
values, the sense of societal concern and not personal interests ought to finally 
prevail.  As Ernest Hass has noted a long time ago,  
The politics of human choice-the importance of interests tied to ideas and 
carried by politically connected elites and other players… Individuals and 
groups of individuals, their interests, and their ideas mattered.  In his 
view, change in the human aspirations and human institutions over long 
periods is caused mostly by the way knowledge about nature and about 
society is married to political interests and objectives (in Viotti and 
Kauppi, 2001, 224). 
Unlike Syria, Lebanon has always been a vulnerable state with weak 
capabilities.13 Although Syria is a Third World country with limited capabilities, it 
possesses some features of a strong state represented by a level of social cohesion, 
institutional capacities, effective military powers, industrial, and productive 
capabilities.  Nonetheless, not all Third World states can be considered weak states, 
although they subsume some defective sectors, but classification should depend on 
the state’s institutional and infrastructural capabilities, state resources, military 
powers, and its social cohesiveness.  “In empirical terms, the Third World is 
composed of an array of states, exhibiting enormous variation in their economic, 
social, and political conditions.  In theoretical terms, there is no single understanding 
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of the weak state concept” (Job, 2005, 19). 
The institutional capabilities of Syria are more developed than those of 
Lebanon.  However Lebanon’s geographic and strategic location, and its social 
pluralism, has allowed it to retain a level of regional and international attention.  
Misperceptions affected the relationship between Lebanon and Syria tremendously 
and led to dramatic changes on several levels.  In turn, these changes played a major 
role in defining the new political orientations and relations, which mainly took place 
after 2005.  As a result, wrong convictions generated different conflicts, and for 
Mubarak, “motives and strategies in Lebanon have also been shaped by its 
leadership’s historic fears.  Syria’s anxieties stem from the nature of its political 
system and its geographical location” (Moubarak, 2003, 11). 
Accordingly, the internal situation was fueled by tension and threats derived 
from misperceptions and wrong assumptions, which benefited definite interests and 
satisfied personal goals.14 The internally generated insecurities in Lebanon created a 
divided society, and increased security, legitimacy, and capacity gaps.  Consequently, 
some political parties chose to bandwagon by allying with external actors, which 
constituted a major source of threat for some domestic groups, while others chose to 
balance by creating alliances in opposition to the source of that threat (Viotti & 
Kauppi, 1999).  For Stephen Walt, bandwagoning minimizes the prospects of 
security, because it encourages aggressive actions; whereas, balancing promotes more 
secure environments (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).  “The flip side of this relation is also a 
constant in Lebanese politics: local actors deploy transnational ideologies or 
bandwagon with external actors to strengthen their positions in domestic political 
struggles” (Salloukh, 2009a, 1). 
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The bandwagoning and balancing approaches define almost all political and 
confessional alliances in Lebanon and form a response to defensive approaches 
against threats and vulnerabilities encountering their safety.  Thus, different alliances 
formed two major blocs confronting and competing to safeguard their interests and 
preserve their status.  Some groups have chosen to bandwagon by allying with 
powerful Western entities like the European Union and the United States of America 
against Iran and Syria.  The opposite parties have chosen to balance by allying with 
Iran and Syria in order to secure their presence and preserve their interests internally 
and regionally.  The differences in ideas and orientations create political, economic, 
and social stagnation, and lead to an increase in the levels of friction with Syria.  “The 
quest for security may drive states to interfere preemptively in the domestic politics of 
others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone” (Jervis, 1978, 168).  Syria 
needed such justifications to defend its approach and policies towards Lebanon. 
Therefore, preserving their national security and social stability was and is still a 
priority, which requires focused strategies and preemptive plans. 
Syria’s need to stabilize its geopolitical environment means that it has to 
normalize relationships with all parties, despite their differences, in order to minimize 
vulnerabilities and insecurities and creates a cooperative and collaborative situation.  
The historical and geographical existence of both states in unstable region demands 
that each state has to respect the others’ independence, sovereignty, and laws.  An 
existentialist and normative distinction is essential for understanding the impact of the 
dominant forces in this relationship.  
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4.3 Existentialist vs. Normative Explanations 
Existentialists encourage the search for an authentic political identity.  They 
value the use of interacting relationships remote from restrictive norms and rules, 
which curb efforts and bound attitudes.15 A possible clash can emerge between the 
state and inhabitants who demand survival as a security opportunity faraway from the 
impact of the overwhelming regulations.    
 
4.3.1 The Existentialists 
For William McBride, “consciousness is placed in the world, but placed in the 
center if that world is to be intelligible and human” (1997, 466).  Nonetheless, 
MacBride emphasizes the importance of human existence and the realization of 
his/her surroundings.  In an indirect manner, MacBride presents the relation between 
the state and society through collective existence and the impact on social harmony 
and stability.  Human relations are thus essential for building a secure and stable state, 
on that account mutual interactions become a strategy to manage and operate the 
system, as they define the cohesiveness of the society.  Human realities, existence and 
survival are rudiments for existentialist thinkers.  When man becomes aware of his 
own existence as well as the existence of others (Sartre, 1985), existentialist thought 
emerges as a key element in international relations.  The existence of human beings as 
active members in society, requires shaping identities as a necessity to control 
responsive relations, and thus integrates the existentialist concept as an indirect 
method of application.  The lack of self-confidence encourages disputes and increases 
vulnerabilities and threats, unlike confidant and powerful forces that believe in their 
own capabilities for dominating and controlling passive attitudes with weak 
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potentials.  The existentialist becomes an exception in itself the same as the state, and 
turns into a primary value represented by self-preservation and social protection.  
Self-preservation develops into an end, thus seeking available sources in order to 
guarantee and achieve goals.  Carl Schmitt observes that: 
Its superiority derives from its sheer existence: The existence of the state 
is undoubted proof of its superiority over the valid legal norm.  The 
decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense 
absolute... The norm is destroyed in the exception (as cited in Wolin, 
1990, 398). 
The sense of responsibility towards all men enhances social, political, and economic 
relationships, and strengthens the sense of belonging and dependability towards the 
community as a whole, which promotes common concerns.  Such an attitude aims to 
build a cohesive society with cooperative and collaborative intentions and 
inclinations.  Accordingly, “the individual becomes an active member since the 
existentialist declares that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a 
human subjectivity” (Sartre, 1985, 10).  Challenging circumstances reveal realities 
and expose hidden intentions, ipso facto norms are perceived as an obstruction for 
survival and progress, especially that “we always choose the good, and nothing can be 
good for us without being good for all” (Sartre, 1985, 17).  Collective relations define 
the survival of individuals, forging a cohesive community with shared interests as the 
basis for a welfare state.  The general sense of responsibility assists in enhancing 
cooperation through an extensive comprehension of realities as well as surroundings 
necessary to improve relationships and minimize insecurities.  Thus, consciousness 
and awareness turns into an attribute of the existentialists for guaranteeing security 
and self-preservation, in view of the fact that wars leave affected individuals deprived 
of their humanity, dignity, and shelters.  Robert Gilpin emphasized the consequences 
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of war throughout history,   
Changes in power lead to changes in relations among states… 
Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new 
round of hegemonic conflict.  It has always been thus and always will be, 
until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective 
mechanism of peaceful change (as cited in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, 166).  
 Accordingly, all sources that generate vulnerabilities and insecurities become real 
enemies with existential anxiety, and “to end war, improve men; or: To end war 
improve states” (Waltz in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, 141).  For Schmitt, “War, the 
readiness for death of fighting men, the physical annihilation of other men who stand 
on the side of the enemy, all that has no normative, only an existential meaning” (as 
cited in Wolin, 1990, 406).  War cannot be defined by rules and norms, the superior 
and powerful wins, whereas the weak and vulnerable loses.  Humans realize their 
existence and the existence of their surrounding whenever they face real threats and 
insecurities.  They define their identities and try to define themselves in accordance to 
the actual capacities of their enemies in order to build proper strategies that can 
safeguard them from inescapable harm.  
The insecurity dilemma lies at the core of the existentialist approach, and 
accordingly, in addition to state structure and defective behaviors, war turns into a 
primary source of threat.  Irresponsible actions derived from selfishness and 
unjustifiable use of coercive force against citizens, add to and increase the prospects 
of insecurities. 
 
4.3.2 Normative Behavior 
Norms govern our actions and regulate our daily behaviors, and are especially 
designed to benefit and not restrict the state and its institutions.  At this point, the 
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exceptional precedes norms in defining the state as an identifiable and distinguishable 
entity.  For Schmitt, “the moment of ‘concrete indifference’ represents a type of ‘vital 
substrate’, that element of pure life opposed to the formalism of law” (as cited in 
Wolin, 1990, 395).  Although, they are important features of the state that demand 
obedience and respect for stability and security purposes, but when the existence and 
idea of the state is jeopardized by their presence, their role comes to an end.  Thus, 
they create a state of dependency in some cases and interdependency in others.  The 
generated interdependent actions and social expectations are caused by motives of 
either conforming with or controlling others’ expectations (Kondo, 1990).  
“Interdependence does not mean equality.  Interdependence connotes some degree of 
vulnerability by one party to another” (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, 76).  Therefore, 
normative behavior is a stabilizer and organizer more than a creator, and rationality is 
the basic element for providing normative behavior with the required effectiveness.  A 
system of expectations and plans enhances normative adjustments and minimizes 
undesired responses.  Thus, security concerns become a priority.  “Information that 
reduces uncertainty is therefore an important factor in world politics.  But information 
is not a systemic constant” (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, 177).  Despite the fact that 
knowledge is not the only ultimate option, it is an effective one to learn from.  It 
enables the process of designing appropriate norms and regulations for tackling 
unexpected incidents.  Because of that, it helps in increasing preparedness, awareness, 
and alertness levels for facing critical situations.  Waltz notes that, “variations in 
information may be important in influencing state behavior” (in Viotti and Kauppi, 
1999, 177).  Variation is a healthy feature, if it is accurate and suitable for the 
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specified situation.  Bearing in mind, it increases the availability of options and 
provides a variety of possibilities with diverse solutions. 
The normative behavior supported by a variety of proper information, 
enhances cooperative performance of rational individuals who seek reciprocity and 
mutual relationships for a stable and secure society.  Consequently, norms and 
regulations in their natural realm are vital for reinforcing security levels and 
minimizing insecurities and instabilities. 
 
4.4 The Ripening Influence 
The ripe moment is the answer for almost every question.  For Campbell, 
“Ripeness of time is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy… You have to do the 
right thing at the right time” (as cited in Zartman, 2000, 226).  The core of ripening 
theory demands appropriate timing, place, and readiness for achieving desired 
outcomes.  “The ripening theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, 
parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others efforts to turn the conflict 
toward resolution through negotiation” (Zartman, 2000, 228).  But, how is ripening 
theory related to the insecurity dilemma?  Mary-Jane and Marius Deeb argue that: 
One of the major reasons for the failure of the negotiations in the 
Lebanese case was the fact that the basic elements of the ripe moment 
were not present.  Ripe moments, according to Zartman occur when three 
elements are present: a mutually hurting stalemate, a formula for a way 
out, and valid spokesmen (1991, 92). 
Regrettably, Lebanon missed the opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of the 
state and increase levels of national consciousness.  Instead, instability dominated 
society and opened the space widely for undesired interferences and disputes.  
Although the time factor might seem irrelevant, its presence ensures successful 
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outcomes for conveying the weakness and vulnerability of the state and motivating 
stability and security instead. 
Eliminating insecurities is not as easy as generating them.  Highly conscious 
attitudes supported by the time factor can ease situations and facilitate solutions.  
Within plural and confessional societies, the psychological and social impediments, in 
addition to divergent interests, reinforce political disputes with dramatic antagonisms.  
Grasping the right moment can minimize the levels of insecurities, but one might 
question how this can be accomplished and whether it is possible?  Circumstances and 
interactive approaches provide the appropriate answer, as they require ripe moments 
for achieving successful outcomes.  Nevertheless, compliance with rules may 
eliminate barriers, but when the international, regional, and domestic institutions 
become subject to and subjugated by different influential forces, their role is 
neutralized.  Thus, enhancing empathy among different sectarian groups, counters 
political dissonance.  It creates a state of satisfaction and encourages determinism as a 
requirement for harmony.   On that account, displaying the positive forces rather than 
restrictive ones, augment the possibilities of proper results.   
    
4.5 Institutions: Functions and Capabilities 
What impact do institutions have on insecurity levels?  How do political 
parties influence the role of state institutions?  What results can be derived? 
“The institutions of the state comprise the entire machinery of the government, 
including its executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, and laws, 
procedures and norms by which they operate” (Buzan, 1991, 82-83).  Norms, laws, 
and rules regulate state institutions, hence they tend to restrict powers and define 
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authorities.  Nevertheless, institutions aim to organize both state and citizens’ affairs 
and facilitate their relations.  The diversity of state institutions demands strict 
regulations for defining and organizing their missions and specifying their duties.  
Their function as juncture between the government and society stipulates their 
integrative roles.  They are of hierarchal order with terminating procedures of 
authorities when needed to set preferences and limit powers.  The main goal of 
institutions is to maintain stability, effectiveness, and regularity in interactions 
(MacCormick, 1998).  Institutions are essential for providing the society with the 
necessary services, security, and policies.  Due to their active and dynamic 
orientations, they turn into a target for capture by actors aiming at weakening the 
state, either through corruption or by inviting external interferences.  For many, a 
weak state means weak institutions, for that reason institutions define the nature of the 
relationship between the state and society. 
 
4.5.1 Institutional Function and the Impact of Political Parties 
Institutions are composed of legally binding instruments and tools with 
different tasks and purposes.  They constitute a medium of cooperation in some 
instances, an arena that causes change in other cases, and a reflection of the interests 
of the state in almost all stages (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).  Therefore, institutions are 
considered the most powerful and integrative bodies with vital regulatory agents 
possessing an authoritative character that play the role of a catalyst for organizing the 
relationship between the state and society (MacCormick, 1998). 
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Political parties and statesmen influence the role of the institutions, and at the 
same time, they are bound and obligated by the rules, which regulate and govern the 
performance and affairs of these institutions without missing the impact of foreign 
interferences on their attainments.  The confessional system in Lebanon, and the 
nature of the state structure, allows sectarian political parties to manipulate the 
political system and jeopardize social relations by influencing the role of state 
institutions.  The negative sovereignty attributed to Lebanon drove statesmen and 
traditional ruling families to seek international approval from external actors.  As 
mentioned in chapter three, President Bashar Asad supported amending the laws and 
permitted the extension of the presidential tenure of President Emile Lahoud for 
another three years in 2004.  Domestic groups and international powers incited 
Lebanese protestors to accuse Syria of interfering in Lebanese internal affairs, and 
demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territories.  The tense 
situation created insecure feelings, striving to jeopardize the historical relations 
between Lebanon and Syria.  This increased the gap between the state and society 
from one side, and resulted in a gap among the Lebanese communities themselves on 
Figure 4.1: Illustrates and presents the hierarchal levels of the state interactive procedures.  
 75 
the other.  As a consequence, the legitimacy and pragmatism of the state institutions 
was jeopardized and debilitated. 
 
4.6 The Use of Force 
Internal and external actors are either sources of insecurities or generators of 
stability.  The internal use of force can be divided into two main parts, depending on 
situations and circumstances and can be classified as legitimate and illegitimate 
powers, whereas the external use of force seeks to secure the state from external 
threats and attacks.   
 
4.6.1     Internal Use of Force 
a.  Legitimate and Illegitimate Forces 
The legitimate use of force is used to preserve stability and security and 
protect the citizens from dangers.  Implementing justice and enforcing regulations 
through special institutions, safeguards the state and society.  Therefore, the Internal 
Security Forces (ISF) under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
military institutions, including the national army under the authority of the Ministry of 
Defense, are the sole entities authorized to use legitimate force.  The main aim is to 
ensure security and maintain stability, and accordingly build trust in the capabilities of 
the state for gaining the respect and loyalty of citizens.  However, the state wins when 
security, stability, and public safety can be achieved.  The paradox emerges when the 
state turns into an oppressive and repressive force against the citizens.  Examining 
cases, in which the state undertakes such oppressive actions, helps in identifying the 
exact sources of insecurities. 
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The use of illegitimate force is the second part, which highlights exceptions 
and irregularities in the performance of the regime.  The stick and carrot approach 
becomes the tool for persecuting and abusing citizens under the cover of protection.  
Instead of enhancing state stability and security, the security forces develop into an 
effective instrument for subjugating the society and generating chaos resulting in 
excess of oppression followed by discrimination.  Although, it is an unusual situation, 
unluckily corrupted and weak regimes tend to use this technique as an effective option 
for securing their longevity and preserving their interests.  In 2006, the 
nongovernmental human rights organization “Support of Lebanese in Arbitrary 
Detention” (SOLIDA) issued a report documenting various types of tortures allegedly 
practiced at the Ministry of Defense between 1992 and 2005 (Diplomacy in Action, 
2008). 
However, distinguishing between the unintentional harm caused by the use of 
force and intentional one is important to clarify misconceptions and prevent confusion 
concerning this specific argument.  Unfortunately, almost all dramatic incidents and 
clashes were and are still proclaimed and justified as unintentional flaws.  No 
authority admits its responsibility despite the fact that the preservation of state 
security is a compulsory act and an attribute, which concerns both the state as well as 
its inhabitants.  Therefore, maintaining the security factor is not an option; it is a 
demand, which requires minimizing misperceptions, seeing that they are major 
enemies for the stability of the state.  “High levels of uncertainty reduce confidence 
with which expectations are held, and may lead governments to discount the future 
heavily” (Keohane in Viotti and Kauppi, 1999, 177).  Consequently, citizens develop 
a sense of intimidation and fear, because their protector turns out to be the agitator, 
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and as a result, their loyalty to the state diminishes and threatens national unity and 
harmony.   
 
b. External Use of Force 
Political parties and armed militias undermine the role of the national army by 
searching for powerful foreign allies to empower their status and secure them from 
harm.  The excess in dependency and reliance on foreign allies open opportunities for 
further interferences in domestic affairs.  At the same time, they restrict the reach of 
necessary supplies and advanced weapons to the army for vanquishing and 
dominating its powers and capabilities.  However, technological advancement 
enhances capacities and promotes competition among and between states, on the other 
hand it fosters internal tension derived from the constant threat from others. 
The invitation of Syrian troops was an opportunity to protect the interests of 
its Lebanese allies via fighting separatists groups, securing shared borders, and 
limiting the possible danger of an Israeli counter attack.  Unfortunately, for some 
parties, this act was perceived as Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs, which 
further fragmented society.  The constant challenges from various armed militias 
increased the weakness of the state and aided in diminishing the role of the national 
army.  The deteriorating situation affected the performance of the institutions and 
influenced social unity negatively. 
 
4.6.2 Use of Force and the Institutions 
“The institutions of the state are much more tangible than the idea of the state 
as an object of security” (Buzan, 1991, 86).  As mentioned earlier, institutions are 
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dynamic elements and primary providers of different services, and accordingly the 
progress of the state is measured by the potency and effectiveness of its institutions.  
Besides political parties, which possess the capacity to obstruct decisions, dominate 
institutions and result in corruption, sectarianism and confessional systems aid in 
fragmenting society.  Accordingly, the presence of disputed sectarian and 
confessional communities promote chaos and endanger the existence of legitimate 
national forces. 
Lebanon was on the brink of total collapse during the civil war, owing to the 
domination by armed militias and sectarian and confessional political parties, in 
addition to foreign-armed guerillas (PLO), and then by the Syrian troops and the 
Israeli Defense Army.  An unusual combination led to the rupture of state institutions.  
In 2005, the situation reemerged with the existence of old and new actors.  Thus, 
military institutions failed to protect citizens from excess violence and to preserve the 
state from falling into chaos.  The capabilities of previous and current armed militias 
superseded those of the state, including the ISF and the national army.  The phantom 
of civil war was revealing itself again, fueled with high levels of tension among and 
between the sectarian and confessional communities despite the existence of cross-
sectarian political alliances.  Consequently, the democratic game in Lebanon was 
facing threats, which affected the performance of institutions and jeopardized the 
stability of society. 
  
4.6.3 The Diplomatic Path 
Negotiations and compromises are effective solutions for weak states with 
little or no military capabilities; it is the last haven for solving problems with minimal 
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casualties.  National harmony demands setting aside sectarian and confessional 
interests, but in Lebanon blind loyalty to political leaders and sectarian rulers 
dominates.  State elites are a major part of the problem, and in some instances, they 
constitute the obstacle.  Their willingness to let their followers forget and forgive 
remains a doubtful reality.  The dilemma lies in a contradictory situation, and no one 
is willing to sacrifice for the sake of the state.  Political dynamics in spring 2008 
confirmed and proved the unwillingness of statesmen to forfeit their interests in order 
to protect and preserve the security, stability, and harmony of the state.  Despite the 
extensive dialogues between different political and sectarian leaders, citizens were the 
only victims who fell into the trap of bloody clashes.  Nevertheless, state elites 
possessed the necessary authority to control incidents and prevent clashes, but 
indirectly they aided in the deterioration of the situation. 
 
4.7 Psycho-Social links 
How do psycho-social attitudes affect political relationships?  Political 
decisions are governed by psychological and social influences based on the reality 
that statesmen are human beings and can make mistakes by making wrong decisions 
as any other human being would.  Politicians are thus a major source of insecurities 
resulting from corruption and misuse of the state assets and resources. 
Different behaviors and attitudes precipitate insecurities and vulnerabilities, 
and hence find in weak states a natural home for exacerbating insecurities.  According 
to Dag Hammerskjöld, “fear motivates much of the human actions” (as cited in Yost, 
1969, 25).  As a result, psychological and social interpretations constitute a 
background for political decisions, because human attitudes and behaviors are subject 
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to modifications according to needs and interests (Yost, 1969).  Thus, highlighting 
such discussions can help in understanding the crux of causes, features, and actors 
who bring about the insecurity dilemma, and reveal the truth behind different causes, 
explaining why some state elites make particular decisions and not others under 
specific circumstances.  Definitely, in addition to interests and values, the answer lies 
in attitudes, mentalities, reactions, and early experiences.  As Charles Yost notes: 
Politics, it is said, is the art of the possible.  It is the art of the 
indispensible, and any politician who does not have a feeling in his bones 
for what is necessary, not just this year but five or ten years hence is not 
likely to survive that long (1969, 210). 
Therefore, psychological behavior and social changes shape political decisions and 
constitute the driving forces, which motivate individuals. 
 
4.7.1 Psychological Interpretations 
Social diversity increases variations in perceptions and interpretations 
depending on interests, values, and attitudes.  “Things are probably not as simple as 
that, thanks to the discrepancies between people’s thoughts and their actions, and to 
the diversity of their wishful impulses” (Freud, 1961, 10).  Therefore, diversity in 
behaviors plays a major role in exacerbating insecurities and creating a wide range of 
gaps between the state and society.  Referring again to Sigmund Freud: 
It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false 
standards of measurement that they seek power, success and wealth for 
themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is 
of true value in life (1961, 10). 
For many it is difficult to differentiate between what is real and what they wish to 
happen, and for every effect, there is a cause and an actor, which generates 
insecurities.  Because of that, insecurities begin as a psychological feeling.  As Yost 
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notes, “In each small daily act of statesmen and ordinary men and women in these 
critical times, the future is imperceptibly and cumulatively determined, judgment is 
pronounced on ourselves by ourselves” (1969, 205). 
On that account, state elites from different backgrounds reflect their attitudes 
and perceptions on their circumstances.  As a result, the individual who has no power 
or authority to cause a change suffers.  Reinforcing discipline can limit corruption and 
resolve defects, whereas the absence of proper enforcement of laws and regulations 
together with corrupted institutions open the door for different types of interferences.  
By linking the behavior of statesmen and state elites to the generation of insecurities 
and vulnerabilities, emphasizes the nature of the relationship between the state and 
society from an attitudinal perspective, and as a complimentary aspect to the 
structural one.  As mentioned earlier, humans are major actors in the state, and their 
attitude and behavior matters.  Humans tend to use force as a tool to gain benefits and 
utilize all available means for their own sake in order to protect their status.  
Although, Humans are good in nature, but circumstances, interests, and benefits divert 
them from good towards evil.  On that account, individual behavior is also a factor of 
insecurities, especially when it coincides with weak state institutions.  Total 
dependence on the analysis of behaviors and attitudes is risky;16equally,  social factors 
are complementary for the analysis. 
 
4.7.2 Social Factors 
Walid Mubarak notes that, “Key factors in the development of these 
unfortunate conditions was not so much the intentions of specific people and groups 
as it was the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Lebanese political 
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system itself” (2003, 4).  However, intentions and behaviors of specific groups 
intensify situations and create tensions despite structural conditions.  The influence of 
individuals on their surroundings is immense, and in turn circumstances affect 
behaviors as well.  Social factors, in addition to psychological ones contribute to and 
increase the structural weaknesses of the political system.  The general development 
of the state and the progress of its institutions are affected by various social forces.  
These forces have a tendency to enhance the performance of institutions and increase 
state achievements.  Thus, distinguishing between negative and positive forces can 
safeguard the state from different pitfalls and secure society from chaos.  As Buzan 
points out: 
The structure of the system and its interaction dynamics complete this 
dilemma by ensuring that any attempt to acquire, or even move towards, 
complete security by any actor will stimulate reactions which raise the 
level of threat in proportion to the measures taken (1991, 331). 
Social forces reinforce threats and endanger social interactions, especially when 
interests supersede values.  This creates social gaps, which endanger state security 
and affect institutional performance.  Social behavior thus constitutes a major 
condition in defining the identity of the state and establishing a cohesive society. 
 In Lebanon, the increase in unemployment rates, lack of proper job 
opportunities, growing poverty, and lack of equitable development, all increase 
anxiety and pressure among different social groups.  The sectarian parties inflame 
tensions by intensifying political rhetoric and mobilize their followers along sectarian 
lines.  This leads the jobless and aimless youth to either migrate or join the militias.  
Unfortunately, small personal disputes amplify into bloody confrontations.  Social 
burdens stimulate psychological feelings that steer the proliferation of security, 
legitimacy, and infrastructural gaps.  Citizens gradually start to lose faith in the 
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capabilities of the state and its institutions, and they champion the parties that protect 
them instead.  This creates a burden on the development process and results in an 
increase in internal and external migration rates and domestic insecurities.  Migdal 
draws attention to, 
The state’s injection of new social organizations, resources, symbols, and 
forces into an arena enables it to appropriate existing social forces and 
symbols in order to establish a new pattern of domination… When the 
non-state social forces rise to the top… the organization and symbols of 
the state’s components are appropriated by the local dominating social 
forces and the transformation of the local components of the state is so 
extensive as to harm significantly the state’s overall chances of achieving 
integrated domination in society (1994, 25). 
It is the state’s responsibility to minimize these attitudes in order to regulate social 
behaviors.  However, state efforts alone might not be the only effective source for 
controlling existing forces.  Civil society plays a major role in motivating and 
regulating public opinion.  “Civil society assumes the existence of a normative 
consensus or hegemony of fundamental ideas among social forces, even among 
contending groups; this consensus represents a prevailing moral or social order” 
(Migdal, 1994, 28).  Accordingly, social forces are a vital feature for the stability and 
security of the state.  “If society is the outermost limits with which people identify, 
then it is the state that initially determines those limits or social boundaries” (Migdal, 
1994, 23).  Therefore, the state has to regulate social forces, define civil society’s 
framework, and prevent possible escalation of undesired behaviors. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Why does the Lebanese state lack effective institutional capacity to provide 
peace and order?  Why does the state face a crisis of popular legitimacy?  Why does 
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the society lack unity?  Blaming others for our misfortunes is misleading.  Both the 
state and society are responsible for Lebanon’s failures. 
The existentialist and normative approaches explain both the direct and 
indirect features of the insecurity dilemma.  Both approaches offer valid explanations 
and call attention to its degenerating consequences.  Nonetheless, the study of human 
behavior and interactive relationships support and complement the previous 
arguments concerning state structure, institutions, and state-society relations.  They 
present intentions, aims, and goals, which generate weaknesses and result in 
insecurities and vulnerabilities.  The next chapter briefly searches for an appropriate 
answer to this thesis’ final question: Can Lebanon ever escapes its insecurity 
dilemma?   
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Table 4.1 
The Implicit Level 
Image of Man Causal Mechanism Optimal Context 
What motivates actions? What directs actions? What are the efficient 
conditions for actions? 
Rationality Maximization of Utility Free, non-regulated 
competitive markets 
The Explicit Level 
Image of Man Causal Mechanism Optimal Context 
What motivates actions? What directs actions? What are the efficient 
conditions for actions? 
Existential Insecurity Conformity to peers Dense and small 
communities, based on 
shared norms and values 
Table 4.1: Presents different levels of behavior (explicit and implicit strands in Coleman’s 
sociological analysis), explicit level / optimal context, the markets can represent states and 
societies.  
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Chapter Five 
Escaping the Insecurity Dilemma 
5.1 By Way of a Conclusion 
This thesis examined the consequences of the insecurity dilemma in Lebanon 
based on the definition provided by Job.  It also highlighted the nature of the 
relationship with Syria from the security complex perspective as presented by Buzan.  
The main argument presented in this thesis is that Lebanon’s domestic socio-political 
structure and regional position has exacerbated its insecurity dilemma.  Likewise, the 
insecurity dilemma has benefitted from the resulting situation.  The psychological 
dimension cannot be totally discarded, however, seeing that it affects the decision-
making process and generates gaps between the state and society.  On top of that, the 
institutions of the state turn into a medium for precipitating insecurities due to excess 
in corruption and the inadequate behaviors of local actors.  Adding to the previously 
mentioned factors, the confessional system in Lebanon thus replicates and exacerbates 
the country’s insecurity dilemma. 
The weakness of the Lebanese state has invited foreign interference, which 
added more burdens to the situation in Lebanon than the state can absorb.  These 
difficulties jeopardized national security and increased insecurities and vulnerabilities, 
which undermined national unity and have contributed in fragmenting the society.  
Nonetheless, the lack of national cohesion not only affected the domestic situation, it 
also influenced state decisions concerning regional and international relations.  The 
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fluctuating internal situation in Lebanon has affected relationships with neighboring 
countries, especially Syria, and threatened the historical relations between the two 
countries.  Instead of enhancing the position of the state, political parties manipulated 
state assets and exploited policies in order to fulfill their interests and ensure their 
longevity.  Domestic divisions increased the dependency of the state on foreign 
powers, owing to the decrease in institutional capabilities and resources, in addition to 
the constant search for powerful foreign allies that guarantee protection.  In turn, the 
excess of foreign influence weakened internal cohesion and threatened state 
institutions.  The negative impact of these influences on state institutions led to an 
almost total institutional paralysis, and a sectarian take-over instead. 
The Lebanese political system principally calls for coordination and 
collaboration among the different sects, which should bring about social coexistence 
and harmony.  Yet, the problem is in the implementation of constitutional clauses and 
the resulting corruption.  Therefore, any attempt to escape the insecurity dilemma 
requires plenty of efforts from all domestic actors. 
 
5.2 The Future of Insecurities in Lebanon 
Can Lebanon escape its insecurity dilemma?  How can Lebanon achieve this 
objective?  The previous chapters discussed the insecurity dilemma extensively, 
providing examples to validate the theoretical argument of this thesis.  The lack of 
social cohesiveness, infrastructural and institutional capacities, and legitimacy 
increases the insecurity levels and affects behavioral attitudes in Lebanon, unlike the 
situation in Syria.  Therefore, achieving national consensus and proper 
implementation of regulations enable statesmen, as well as ordinary citizens to protect 
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and preserve the institutions of the state by creating regular interactive relationships 
between the state and society.  Because the insecurity dilemma is not static in nature, 
and oscillates depending on the intensity of the intervening and dominating actors, it 
consequently causes instability.  In addition to its unpredictable forces, this situation 
reflects negative effects on the development process in Lebanon, thus making the 
possibility of escaping the insecurity dilemma a difficult task.  By strengthening state 
institutions and internal unity, external influences can be decreased, and replaced by 
opportunities guaranteeing to create social balance.  The stability of the political, 
social, educational, and health sectors are affected by the stability of the economic 
situation.  Lebanon faces both political turbulence and economic stagnation, due to 
weak political and confessional system with a divided society, which results in 
instability and vulnerability.  This, in turn, forms an endless circle of insecurities. 
In addition to the internal and external factors, the geographic location of 
Lebanon attracts different powers with various ambitions and results in an unusual 
situation.  This also affects the decision-making process and the strategies of the state 
in general.  Lebanon became and is still an arena for foreign and domestic disputes, 
threatening citizens and jeopardizing the proper functioning of the state and non-state 
institutions. 
Throughout history, Lebanese have demonstrated a stubborn persistence 
against failure despite threats and vulnerabilities.  The present situation creates a 
medium for weakening and fragmenting the state because of the lack of infrastructure, 
institution, and human capabilities.  Successive wars limited the progress of the state, 
and created fragmented societies.  It resulted in material and non-material breakdown 
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of both the state and social institutions.  They thus affected the overall capabilities of 
the state and led to national insecurities. 
Persistent problems are renewed with every disagreement, hence making the 
possibility of maintaining the security of the state a difficult task.  Appropriate timing 
and efficacious circumstances are partial solutions for bringing the conflicting parties 
together, whereas cooperative attitudes increase the prospects for resolving conflicts.  
The insecurity attributes are not formed from void, but are the cumulative summation 
of structural and psychological factors with recessive threats, which promote chaos 
and generate inescapable insecurities.  Inevitably, the possibility of escaping the 
insecurity dilemma remains a slim one.  Lebanese citizens and politicians alone 
should decide whether or not they are willing to live in harmony and escape the 
consequences of the country’s insecurity dilemma. 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISF Internal Security Forces 
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization  
PSP     Progressive Socialist Party  
SOLIDA Support of Lebanese in Arbitrary Detention 
SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
UNIFIL   United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon 
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
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Notes (Chapter Two) 
 
1 Negative sovereignties require international recognition, they are an attribute of Third World 
countries in general, and weak states in particular, unlike positive ones, which signifies 
developed and powerful countries. 
 
2 Balancing requires alliance formation with the opposition to the source of threat, and 
bandwagon represents the alliance with the source of threat.  The realists tend to perceive the 
balance of power as a sort of interdependence since it constitutes and shapes the framework of 
relations and interactions between and among states.  For Stephen Walt, “Because the system 
is anarchic, each state has to survive on its own.  Waltz argued that this condition would lead 
weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals.” (Walt, 
1998, 31). 
 
 
Notes (Chapter Three) 
 
3 Khazen provided an example derived from an international experience and highlighted the 
impact of this defect on the cohesion and proper integration of the society in the state affairs; 
“The state plays a similar role in other democratic plural societies such as Belgium, 
Switzerland, and Canada.  However, in these countries the communal structure of society is 
institutionalized in the federal political system.  In Practice, this means that the cultural, 
regional, and linguistic differences are unambiguously recognized by the state.  In political 
terms, this translates into political decentralization.  In Lebanon the process is reversed” 
(Khazen, 2000, 95).  
 
4 Sovereign states are independent entities with full control over the state institutions and 
decision-making process including policy implementation accompanied with legitimate use of 
force to maintain stability and security.  Accordingly, the ideologies and orientations of the 
regime in power dominate.  In turn, foreign interferences subjugate decision-making and 
intimidate the independency as well as the freedom of choice and expression.  “General 
environment be laboring under a prolonged and intense state of turmoil, a participatory and 
pluralist system linked demographically or ideologically with other countries in the region 
will have no chance of maintaining neutrality and domestic tranquility” (Harik as cited in 
Mubarak, 2003, 3) 
 
5 The insecurity dilemma features as defined by Brian Job (2005) dominated the situation in 
Lebanon, and helped in forming a weak state with frail capabilities and resources. 
 
6 For further information concerning this issue, refer to Adeed Dawisha (1980), Syria and the 
Lebanese Crisis. 
 
7 General Jadid insisted on the application of radical domestic and foreign policies (Dawisha, 
1980). 
 
8 Syria attempted to unify the political decision-making process especially after the turbulent 
situation before 1970 and promoted chaos and disarrays.  After President Hafiz Asad took 
hold of the Baath Party, he started a reformation operation for lively sectors in order to 
normalize relations and stabilize the general situation.  Thus, Syria turned into a powerful 
regional force that demanded international respect. 
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9 The agreement between Hizballah and Al Tayyar Al Watani Al Hurr (National Liberal 
Party) has changed the rules of the game and affected the political equation.  General Aoun 
was a member of 14th of March alliance, but due to several interests and concerns, he shifted 
his orientations towards 8th of March alliance.  Therefore, Lebanese politics depend on 
interests more than values and tight commitments. 
 
10 Political Alliances in Lebanon have changed in a dramatic way, thus changing the rules of 
the balance of power.  As an example, the progressive socialist party was a strategic ally of 
the Palestinians during the civil war.  In 2005, the head of the party, deputy Walid Jumbulat 
became a major actor and an initiator of the Lebanese Politics.  Consequently, he allied with 
rightist groups like Lebanese Forces, and the Phalange party, who were against left parties 
during the Lebanese civil war. 
 
11 Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; Calls for the disbanding 
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias (UNSCR 1559). 
 
 
Notes (Chapter Four) 
 
12 The influence of policies and rules is significant and can result in drastic social, political, or 
economic changes.  Accordingly, their impact on individuals and situations evinces the 
demand for survival.  As a result, disputes exacerbate between reformers and those affected by 
the resulted change.   
 
13 The strength and weakness of the state affects relationships with other states.  For Jervis, 
States, which lack powerful military capabilities and adopt passive and flawed foreign policies 
have little impact and exerts little or no pressure at all on the nearby states (1978).  
14 Their proclaimed threat is based on illusionary fears demanding protection from foreign 
powers.   
15 The dialectic concerning the normative and existentialist approaches is a controversial one.  
The former venerates laws and norms, whereas the latter emphasizes the importance of the 
sate and individuals.  Accordingly, the existentialist believes in the existence, survival, 
capabilities and constant progress of the individual and the state.  The dialectic turns into a 
mismatch norms and existence. 
 
16 Depending on the analysis of personalities alone can be a misleading attempt and results in 
wrong assumptions.  Therefore, accurate definitions in addition to proper assessments can 
help in emphasizing the right image and highlighting true values. 
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